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Policing Standard Form Contracts in Germany and South 
Africa: A Comparison 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Today an agreement between two parties is often embodied in a 
standardised document, which has been specially drafted.1  Such 
standard form contracts probably account for more than 99 % of all 
contracts made today.2   
 
You take your cell phone to repair and get a receipt for it. The 
receipt has your name, the price of service and probably a written number 
on its front side. On its reverse side it contains a list of written terms. You 
surf in the Internet and buy an airplane ticket for your next holidays. You 
pay for the ticket by entering your credit card number in the seller’s form. 
On the bottom of the page is a request to accept the seller’s standard 
terms and two buttons, one marked “I accept” and the other “I do not 
accept”. You click the “I accept” button without reading the terms.  
 
These transactions are ordinary and routine in our daily life and aim 
at purchasing a simple product or service. Other considerations, such as 
the specifications in the small print, are secondary.3  In typical situations, 
the party subject to the standard form contract terms (or submitting party4) 
has no option but to use the offered services. Such inferior bargaining 
position of the submitting party often results in an abuse of standard form 
contract terms by their users (hereinafter: the user). Therefore, special 
                                                 
1 S Van der Merwe, L Van Huysteen, M Reinecke and G Lubbe Contract, General 
Principles 2ed (Landsdown: Juta Law, 2003) at 285. 
2 WD Slawson ‘Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power’ 
(1971) 84 Harvard LR 529 at 529. Professor Slawson did not provide any support for this 
statement, but it has been repeatedly cited without question by scholars and courts. 
3 J Burke ‘Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach’ (2000) 24 Seton Hall 
Legislative J 285 at 286. 
4 The terms ‘party subject to (standard form) contract terms’ and ‘submitting party’ will be 
used interchangeably.   
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treatment of standard form contracts, which provides for protection from 
unfair contract terms, might be necessary.    
 
The aim of this dissertation is to compare South African law on 
standard form contracts against the corresponding German law. Thus, the 
responses of both legal systems to the special situation occurring in cases 
of standard form contracts will be compared and evaluated. Thereby, the 
focus of this dissertation is to determine whether South African law on 
standard form contracts provides adequate protection for the submitting 
party. German law on standard form contracts provides the basis and 
outline against which South African law will be critically evaluated. German 
law was selected for this task, as it was one of the first legal systems, 
which enacted legislation, and addresses the issue systematically. It 
should be noted that this dissertation does not aim to evaluate German 
law on standard form contracts.  
 
In the first part of this dissertation I will provide a brief definition of 
the notion of freedom of contract and consumer protection. I will then 
proceed to highlight the relevance of standard form contracts in modern 
society and outline the problems associated with such contracts. This will 
be followed by a discussion of whether standard form contracts can be 
considered as classical contracts. In the second part of this dissertation I 
will outline the law on standard form contracts in both jurisdictions. 
Concerning the German law, I will give a brief overview of what the 
relevant provisions state. Concerning South African law, I will briefly 
illustrate what the relevant common law appears to be without going into 
far too much depth. Such outlines of the applicable laws are necessary in 
order to acquaint the reader with some of the important themes that this 
dissertation will discuss in detail. In part three the actual comparison and 
evaluation will follow. The comparison will include a detailed illustration of 
the law on standard form contracts in both jurisdictions. Thereby, some 
repetition in regard to the applicable law cannot be avoided. Thereafter, 
the evaluation will more specifically investigate whether South African law 
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is effective in achieving its aims and whether South Africa should 
introduce legislation on standard form contract terms. 
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Part I 
Outline of the Underlying Problems Associated with Standard Form 
Contracts 
 
Chapter One  
The Conflict between Freedom of Contract and Consumer Protection 
 
Standard form contract law protects from oppressive contract terms. Such 
protection limits freedom of contract. Accordingly, writing about this topic 
requires one to illustrate the conflict that generally arises between the 
notion of freedom of contract and consumer protection.  
 
 
A.  Definition of Freedom of Contract 
No aspect of private law is more important for the self-determination of an 
individual than freedom of contract. Contract, in general,   
 
‘stands for the idea that co-ordination and co-operation for common purposes is best 
achieved in a given society by allowing individuals and legal entities to make, for their 
own accounts and on their own responsibility, significant decisions on the production 
and distribution of goods and services by entering into enforceable agreements 
based on freely given consent.’ 5  
 
In this context, most of us rely on free contractual exchange and take 
contract for granted.6  As a flexible instrument, which constantly adapts 
itself, contract is moreover essential for a free economy: it is essential for 
private enterprise and for the construction of economic relationships.7
 
As a result, the notion of freedom of contract is one of the basic 
principles of both German and South African contract law. This notion 
entitles everybody to conclude a contract with a freely chosen person and 
                                                 
5 H Kötz ‘Controlling Unfair Contract Terms: Options for Legislative Reform’ (1986) 103 
SALJ 405 at 405. 
6 Ibid. 
7 N Horn, H Kötz and HG Leser German Private and Commercial Law: An Introduction 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 84. 
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allows one to freely determine the provisions of the contract without 
arbitrary or unreasonable legal restrictions. In other words, each person 
should be free to decide whether, with whom, and on what terms to 
conclude a contract.8
 
In Germany, there is a wider notion of freedom of contract, which 
contains a distinction between the freedom to enter into a contract 
(Abschluβfreiheit) and the freedom to shape the conditions of a contract 
(Gestaltungsfreiheit). Such a distinction is not evident in South African law. 
Moreover, some German commentators emphasise that freedom of 
contract is part of the general freedom of action as contained in Art 2(1) of 
the German Constitution (Grundgesetz, hereinafter referred to as GG) and 
therefore enjoys constitutional protection.9  Also in South African law, it 
was recently held that the notion of freedom of contract is enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution10  as it is part of the 
fundamental right to freedom.11  
 
 
B.  Brief Notes about the History of Freedom of Contract 
Freedom of contract is not a creation of modern contract law. Its roots can 
be found in the social, economic and political philosophies of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, in attempts to define basic human rights.12  
During that period Thomas Hobbes, inter alia, expressed freedom of 
contract as a fundamental human right.13  In his view liberty only existed 
where a person was free to act unrestricted by external legal or social 
impediments. He developed the idea that liberty could be expressed by 
means of fundamental rights with freedom of contract as one of them. 
John Stuart Mill, too, considered freedom of contract as being a part of the 
                                                 
8 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 10. 
9 D Medicus Allgemeiner Teil des BGB 8ed (Heidelberg: Hüthig Fachverlage, 2002) at 
172.    
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
11 Mort NO v Henry Shield-Chiat 2001 (1) SA 464 (C). 
12 P Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (Cape Town: Juta 
& Company Limited, 1979) at 1. 
13 T Hobbes Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 145-146. 
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general freedom of action.14  In his opinion, the function of the law was to 
ensure that contractual intentions were carried out. Finally, the notion of 
freedom of contract and action became widespread in conjunction with the 
doctrine of laissez faire in the nineteenth century.15  In a laissez-faire 
marketplace, individuals interact freely and without governmental 
restrictions.16  In this system of natural liberty, freedom of contract was 
considered to be vital for the continuance of trade and industry.17
 
It was in this climate judges in English and American courts tried to 
formulate a judicial notion of freedom of contract.18  One of the most 
notable to this effect is that of Sir George Jessel MR, who said: 
 
‘[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, 
and that their contracts when entering into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred 
and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore you have this paramount public 
policy to consider – that you are not likely to interfere with this freedom of contract.’ 19
 
In the twentieth century, South African judges also adopted the 
notion of freedom of contract. South African writers and judges have used 
it in four different senses:20  firstly, it has been used to give individuals the 
freedom to negotiate the terms of their contracts without legislative 
interference;  secondly, it has been used to mean that where individuals 
have concluded a contract, the provisions of that contract should be given 
full legal effect; furthermore, freedom of contract has been used to give 
individuals the freedom to select the other contracting party; and finally it 
has been used to give the freedom not to contract.            
 
  
                                                 
14 JS Mill On Liberty (1859).  
15 B Silverglade ‘Contract Terms in the United States and Sweden: A Comparative 
Analysis of Consumer Protection Law and Policy’ (1978-1979) 2 Boston College 
International & Comparative LR 477 at 478.  
16 Ibid. 
17 A Smith Wealth of Nations (1776).  
18 Aronstam (note 12) at 6. 
19 Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462. 
20 Aronstam (note 12) at 13. 
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C.  Restrictions on Freedom of Contract 
From the sixteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, the notion of 
freedom of contract was almost unrestricted.21  However, economic 
growth in Europe and the aggregation of capital within fewer hands as well 
as the growing use of standard form contracts enabled powerful 
contracting parties to impose contractual terms upon weaker parties.22  
Thus consumers23 often became subjected to oppressive contract terms 
by trade and industry. Due to the superior position of most sellers, 
freedom of contract for the consumers existed only theoretically. In 
practice, the notion of freedom of contract became a fiction.  
 
For these reasons, it had been recognised in Germany, that 
freedom of contract was not an end in itself.24  The response to this new 
attitude was to limit freedom of contract in favour of the weaker party and 
in doing so to depart from the principles of liberal individualism and to 
move in favour of individual justice.25  
 
 
D.  Definition of Consumer Protection (Law) 
Freedom of contract nowadays remains the basic principle of contract law 
both in Germany and South Africa, but is subject to limitations. Many 
limitations in this context originate in the phenomenon of consumer 
protection. Before embarking into further details, one firstly has to question 
what this vague expression means. Despite the vast amount of 
publications dealing with consumer protection and its relevance in society, 
                                                 
21 According to Mill’s understanding of freedom of contract, it did not matter that one 
contracting party had bargained from a position of economic inferiority.  Nor did it matter 
that the superior party had imposed unconscionable provisions upon the inferior party. 
Furthermore, the fact that a contractual provision was harsh or oppressive was of little 
concern to the early twentieth century South African Judges, who upheld such on the 
basis that both contracting parties had freely and voluntarily accepted such. Similarly, in 
Germany the civil courts exercised the natural liberal approach to the doctrine of freedom 
of contract well until the twentieth century.      
22 E McKendrick Contract Law  5ed (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003) at 4. 
23 In this dissertation, the terms ‘consumer’ and ‘individual’ will be used interchangeably.  
24 M Habersack and R Zimmermann Legal change in a codified system: Recent 
developments in German Suretyship Law (1999) 3 Edinburgh LR 272 at 277. 
25 McKendrick (note 22) at 4. 
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it is difficult to find a clear definition. One such definition that I managed to 
find reads as follows: 
 
‘Consumer protection is government regulation to protect the interests of consumers, 
for example by requiring businesses to disclose detailed information about products, 
particularly in areas where safety or public health is an issue, such as food. 
Consumer protection is linked to the idea of consumer rights (that consumers have 
various rights as consumers), and to consumer organisations, which help consumers 
to make better choices in the marketplace’26
  
Another definition in the same source reads thus: 
 
‘Consumer protection law or consumer law is considered as an area of public law that 
regulates private law relationships between individual consumers and the businesses 
that sell them goods and services. Consumer protection covers a wide range of 
topics including but not necessarily limited to product liability, privacy rights, unfair 
business practices, fraud, misrepresentation, and other consumer/business 
interactions.’27
 
The roots of consumer protection can be found in the nineteenth 
century. The industrial revolution, which led to mass production and the 
increase of business transactions between sellers and consumers, as well 
as the development of laissez-faire philosophy, which relied on self-
regulation of the market and sought to remove every restriction of trade or 
competition, gave rise to an abuse of the superior business positions by 
the sellers and oppressive contract terms for consumers. As a result, 
modern contract law had been developed in order to protect the weaker 
consumer by placing limitations on the notion of freedom of contract.  
 
 
E.  The Conflict between Freedom of Contract and Consumer 
Protection and Ways of Balancing these Notions 
Freedom of contract and consumer protection illustrate differing policies 
present in the law of contract. Thereby the principle of social control over 
                                                 
26 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumer_protection (accessed on 11/05/05). 
27 Ibid. 
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private decisions opposes the notion of freedom of contract.28  In this 
context, government activities have been directed at protecting the 
consumer’s interests. In protecting the consumer, governments have 
remained careful in keeping the notion of freedom of contract intact.29  
 
Consumer protection has a manifold nature. This dissertation will 
concentrate on consumer protection in private law, particularly in contract 
law. As an example of consumer protection in the field of contract law this 
dissertation deals with the phenomenon of standard form contracts. 
Consumer protection in contract law generally includes an increased 
protection in the process of concluding the contract and increased control 
of the contract once the parties have entered into the agreement.    
                                                 
28 Kötz (note 5) at 406. 
29 Silverglade (note 15) at 480. 
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Chapter Two  
Definition: Standard Form Contracts and Contracts in their Classical 
Sense 
 
A.  Characteristics of Standard Form Contracts 
A standard form contract generally has the following characteristics: It is 
an agreement between two parties that contains predrawn terms and is 
used by a business entity or firm in transactions with consumers.30  The 
contract is used to supply mass demands for goods and services.31  
Generally the will of the user of such contract terms dominates the 
transaction. The consumer is required to accept contractual terms without 
negotiations notwithstanding some particulars. Often the consumer 
accepts such terms without knowing or understanding such.32  Often this 
position exists as the user is in a stronger bargaining position, whereas the 
consumer has little choice other than to accept the terms contained in the 
standard form contract, or at least the consumer thinks so. Clearly an 
unequal situation exists.   
 
 
B.  History of Standard Form Contracts 
Standard form contracts are not a new method of conducting business. In 
the fifteenth century, such contracts were already in use in parts of 
Europe, when standard insurance policies had been issued; as well as 
worldwide in the seventeenth century, when charter-parties and bills of 
lading were drafted in a standard form.33  The general use of standard 
form contracts became widespread in the industrial revolution era of the 
nineteenth century.34  Since then, the use of standard form contracts has 
become the main method of doing business wherever there is legal-
                                                 
30 Burke (note 3) at 288. 
31 A Burgess ‘Consumer Adhersion Contracts and Unfair Terms: A Critique of Current 
Theory and a Suggestion’ (1986) 15 Anglo-American LR 255 at 257.  
32 Ibid. 
33 WS Holdsworth History of English Law 7ed (London: Methuen, 1956) 255-256 and 
290-295.    
34 Aronstam (note 12) at 17. 
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commercial activity.35  Furthermore the development of Internet 
transactions has given standard term contracts an increased importance.36
 
 
C.  Importance of Standard Form Contracts and Relevance in 
Business Life 
The extensive use of standard form contracts reflect today’s underlying 
economic realities and are evidence of their economic necessity.37  
Standard form contracts are the consequence of mass production and 
play an integral part to it.38  Although advantageous, disadvantages do 
exist in their usage.  
 
On the one hand, standard form contracts fulfil an important 
efficiency role in society.39  Standard form contracts facilitate the 
functioning of modern society, which is dependant on the mass production 
of goods. Generally, mass production can be characterised by high 
specialisation, division of labour and the production of large amounts of 
standardised products.40  As a result it provides very inexpensive 
products. However the extreme specialisation of the functions of modern 
life require the formation of detailed contracts on an almost daily basis. In 
this context standard form contracts provide information about the 
transaction and enforce order by setting out the terms and conditions of 
the transaction in writing. They ensure low transaction costs, through 
being mass-produced like the goods and services, which they regulate.41  
 
It is highly unlikely that a contract of that type will ever be “custom 
made”.42  The consumer in a non-standard form transaction would have to 
pay for an attorney to negotiate it and for the extra costs of the seller in 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 JR Maxeiner ‘Standard-terms Contracting in the Global Electronic Age: European 
Alternatives’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal of International L 109 at 111.   
37 Slawson (note 2) at 530. 
38 Ibid. 
39 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_form_contract (accessed on 11/05/05). 
40 http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-68157 (accessed on 10/08/05). 
41 Slawson (note 2) at 530. 
42 Slawson (note 2) at 531. 
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this regard.43  Such increased transaction costs would lead to an increase 
in the price of the product, thus depriving many consumers the opportunity 
to enter into the transaction.44  Therefore, standard form contracts ensure 
an efficient delivery of mass-produced products and benefit the 
consumer.45  Additionally, they assure uniformity and quality of the 
transactions.  Predrawn terms are often better adapted to the special 
needs of the particular bargain as sales persons and consumers are 
neither able and in some cases not permitted to set out their own terms 
and conditions.46  
 
For the aforementioned reasons it is clear that standard form 
contracts serve a useful purpose in enabling parties to conclude their 
negotiations efficiently and without unnecessary costs. However, the 
benefits received by the consumers in this regard are not without their 
disadvantages. 
 
The use of standard form contracts often results in unjust terms to 
the detriment of the contracting parties. Standard form contract terms are 
unilaterally beneficial to their user as lawyers instructed to minimise 
liability usually draft them.47  There exists a high potential for abusing 
standard form contract terms as the user is often in the stronger 
bargaining position and does not allow the consumer to negotiate. Often 
the consumer does not read the standard form contract terms. This may 
occur due to the small print and the complicated legal language in which 
the document is written in. Oppressive or unreasonable terms can 
therefore easily escape the notice of the consumer.48  In this context terms 
governing warranty, damages, attorney’s fees, refund and repair, 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 L Bates ‘Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Consumer Protection’ (2002) 16 Emory International LR 1 at 3. 
45 Ibid. 
46 EM Holmes and D Thurmann ‘A new and old theory for adjucating standardized 
contracts’ (1987) 17 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 323 at 334.   
47 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_form_contract (accessed on 11/05/05). 
48 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 286. 
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indemnification, risk of loss and waiver of rights have a particular potential 
for abuse.49
 
By using standard form contracts an economic disparity arises 
whereby the user gains advantages and the consumer disadvantages. In 
effect, standard form contracts institutionalise the disparity.50  An example 
of this disparity is that the risk-transaction-failure is allocated to the 
economically weaker consumer.51  Unequal standard form contract terms 
constitute a costless benefit for the user. Practically, if the user fails to take 
advantage of these benefits, his competitors will.52  These competitive 
pressures have been in existence for a substantial duration. This has 
resulted in a situation whereby consumers do not even notice the 
unfairness contained in the standard form contract terms anymore.53  
Despite this, some commentators argue that consumers still possess the 
ability to avoid the aforementioned injustices by shopping around for the 
user who offers the most favourable terms.54  However as stated above, 
consumers, do not in the most part, read or necessarily understand the 
terms contained in the standard form contract. Moreover, it is argued that 
consumers are correct to believe that the standard form contracts of the 
other user are also unjust.  
 
As a result of the importance of standard form contracts in modern 
business life and the potential for abuse, policing mechanisms are 
necessary to balance the advantages of standard form contracts and their 
negative ‘side-effects’. In order to compare and evaluate the existing 
policing mechanisms of standard form contracts in German and South 
African law, the phenomenon of a standard form contract finally has to be 
analysed within a framework of the classical definition of a contract. 
 
                                                 
49 New Jersey Law Revision Commission Final Report and Recommendations Relating to 
Standard Form Contracts (1998). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Slawson (note 2) at 531. 
53 Ibid. 
54 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_form_contract (accessed on 11/05/05). 
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D.  Can a Standard Form Contract be considered as contract in the 
classical sense?  
The enforcement of standard form contracts in general is justified by the 
assumption that both the user and the consumer have adopted the 
writing.55  This fictional consent is consistent with the objective character 
of contract law in general.56
 
Freedom of contract entitles everybody to conclude a contract with 
a freely chosen person and freely determine the provisions of the contract 
without arbitrary or unreasonable legal restrictions. In this regard, judicial 
enforcement of contracts derives from the notion of freedom of contract. 
Accordingly, all contracts generally are enforceable. This feature of the law 
of contract is expressed in the Latin maxim, pacta sunt servanda.57  The 
effect of this maxim is existent in both German and South African contract 
law. It requires the enforcement of contractual obligations created in 
circumstances, which are consistent with freedom of contract.58
 
To determine whether a contact exists under South African law, one 
has to look for an agreement by consent of two or more parties.59  More 
specifically, this requires an actual meeting of the minds of the parties or 
the reasonable belief by one of them that there is consensus.60  The 
objective manifestation of the parties’ wills is of importance, due to the fact 
that a court decides from the external facts whether a contract has been 
validly concluded and therefore whether it is enforceable or not.61  Under 
South African law the existence of a contract is evidenced by the 
agreement of two or more parties. This existence is revealed by the 
external manifestations/objective proof of the parties’ subjective 
agreement. To determine whether a true agreement exists, one has to 
                                                 
55 Burke (note 3) at 287. 
56 Ibid. 
57 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 4ed (Durban: Butterworth, 2001) at 24. 
58 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 10. 
59 Christie (note 57) at 23.  
60 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 16. 
61 Christie (note 57) at 24, 25. 
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look for an offer and an acceptance of that offer.62  If a standard form 
contract is used, the user of such contract will typically make the offer and 
the consumer or party subject to the standard form contract terms the 
acceptance.     
 
In German law, a contract is an agreement between two or more 
parties who wish to bring about certain legal consequences.63  In order to 
bring a contract into effect, two or more reciprocal corresponding 
declarations of will of the contracting parties, which subject each other to 
the contract, must be present.64  The corresponding declarations of will 
are offer and acceptance. This position is the same in South African law. A 
further similarity that exists is the need for an objective proof of the 
subjective agreement. 
 
In this context the question now arises, whether a standard form 
contract can be considered a contract in this classical sense. In order to 
ascertain this answer, a standard form contract has to be analysed within 
the framework of the above stated definition of a classical contract. As 
noted earlier, standard form contracts contain predrawn terms in favour of 
the user. Often consumers do not have the opportunity to negotiate or 
even read the terms. Extreme examples in this context are insurance 
policies. Purchasers of insurance often do not receive their policies before 
entering into the contract.65  Therefore, standard form contracts above all 
lack the traditional element of negotiation and agreement in regard to their 
terms.66  
 
Since the consumer is ignorant of both the content and existence of 
the terms within a standard form contract, the terms cannot be considered 
                                                 
62 Christie (note 57) at 31. 
63 BS Markensinis, W Lorenz and G Dannemann The German Law of Obligations, 
Volume I: The Law of Contracts and Restitution: A Comparative Introduction (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997) at 47.    
64 Ibid. 
65 Slawson (note 2) at 540. 
66 Silverglade (note 15) at 478.  
 16 
 
as a manifestation of the consumer’s will and consent.67  However, the 
objective character of the law of contract only places a small emphasis on 
the search for the subjective meeting of the minds of the contracting 
parties. Objective criteria, such as a signature or other manifestations, are 
of crucial importance. The signature or a click on the mouse button during 
an Internet transaction assumes the consumer’s agreement on the 
terms.68  Nevertheless, pretending that the consumer’s signature or other 
manifestation amounts to consent ignores the fact that not much consent 
can be found in most standard form contracts.69
 
As a result, the classification of a standard from contract as a 
contract in the general sense is questionable. The aim of this dissertation 
is to compare and contrast the German and South African approaches to 
standard form contracts. More specifically, the aim is to compare and 
evaluate the mechanisms for policing of standard form contracts in both 
jurisdictions. In undertaking this task, I will illustrate the law on standard 
form contracts in Germany and South Africa in the following part of this 
dissertation. 
                                                 
67 Slawson (note 2) at 541. 
68 Burke (note 3) at 286-288. 
69 Burke (note 3) at 297 
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Part II  
German and South African Law on Standard Form Contracts 
 
Chapter Three 
German Law on Standard Form Contracts 
 
Germany is one of the few countries that have legislation concerning 
standard form contracts. Incorporated in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(German Civil Code, hereinafter BGB), the German legal system deals 
with the phenomenon of standard form contracts and the problems that 
arise comparatively systematically.70  
 
In this chapter, I will first illustrate the German law on standard form 
contracts. The second section will outline the history of the German 
standard form contract law. This historical discussion is useful because in 
Germany, although it is a country of legislation, the law controlling 
standard form contract was initially judge-made. 
 
 
A.  Current German Law on Standard Form Contracts       
The current German law on standard form contracts can be divided into 2 
aspects: the substantive part and the procedural part. The substantive 
provisions deal with the validity of standard form contract terms and are 
incorporated in the BGB.  
 
The relevant provisions can be found in §§ 305 – 310 of the BGB. 
The procedural provisions, which deal with the unenforceability of unlawful 
standard terms, are contained in the Gesetz über Unterlassungsklagen bei 
Verbraucherrechts- und anderen Verstössen (Law of Actions for 
Injunctions for Violations of Consumer and Other Law, hereinafter UklaG).
 
 
                                                 
70 For the exact wording and content of the provisions of the German Law on Standard 
Form Contracts throughout the whole dissertation see Appendix. 
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I.  Substantive Provisions of German Law on Standard Form 
Contracts       
The substantive provisions of standard form contract law are comprised of 
four principal parts: firstly, a determination of its scope of application; 
secondly, an incorporation control of the standard from contract terms; 
followed by a content control; and finally a determination of the 
consequences of invalidity of contract terms. 
 
Before discussing in greater depth, it should be noted that German 
standard form contract law only applies to terms, which provide for 
changes and additions to statutory provisions (§ 307(3) BGB). These 
changes and additions are only possible where the statutory provisions 
are non-mandatory and therefore can be replaced by terms agreed upon 
by the contractual parties. 
 
 
1.  Scope of Application of the German Law on Standard Form 
Contracts 
§ 305(1) BGB states that the provisions of the German law on standard 
form contracts71  are exclusively applicable to standard form contract 
terms. Under § 305(1) BGB, standard form contract terms are defined as 
pre-formulated terms intended to be incorporated into numerous contracts. 
The intention to use the term as a standard term in numerous contracts, 
serves to make § 305(1) BGB applicable, even where the standard terms 
are incorporated into a contract for the first time.72  However, the intention 
to use the standard terms in at least three contracts is required.73  
Furthermore, § 305(1) BGB states that it is important that the standard 
terms have been introduced into the contract by one party, regardless of 
the person who drafted the terms or their appearance. 
 
                                                 
71 §§ 305 – 310 BGB and the provisions contained in the UklaG.
72 Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court, hereinafter BGH) 1991 Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift at 843.  
73 BGH 2002 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 139. 
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Exceptionally, if standard terms have been subject to bargaining 
and the non-drafting party has had a real chance to influence the content 
of the terms, traditional contract law instead of the standard form contract 
law applies, § 305(1) Sentence 3 BGB. 
 
German standard form contract law does not apply to contracts in 
the field of the law of succession, family law and company law or to 
collective agreements and private-or public-sector works agreements, § 
310(4) BGB. According to this provision, German standard form contract 
law applies to labour contracts with modifications.
 
The provisions concerning the scope of application of the German 
law on standard form contracts also provide for a special treatment of 
consumer and commercial contracts (§ 310 (1) and (3) BGB).74  
 
 
2.  Incorporation Control of Standard Form Contract Terms 
Besides defining standard form contract terms, § 305 BGB provides the 
general rule for when such terms become part of a contract as a whole. 
According to § 305(2) BGB, and in order to be valid and enforceable, 
standard form contact terms have to be incorporated into the contract. 
More specifically, this provision states three requirements for such 
incorporation: Firstly, the user of the terms has to give the other party 
notice of the application of such (§ 305(2) No 1 BGB). This notice has to 
be given during the conclusion of the contract and may be oral or in 
writing.75  If, for certain types of contracts, an express notice creates 
disproportionate difficulties, a visible sign stating that the contract is 
subject to standard terms at the place where the contact is concluded is 
sufficient. Secondly, the user of the terms must give the other party an 
opportunity to review them (§ 305(2) No 2 BGB). Thirdly, the other party 
has to agree that the standard terms are to apply (§ 305(2) No 2 BGB). 
 
                                                 
74 For further details see below chapter 5 A I.  
75 H Heinrichs 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 1450. 
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According to § 305a BGB specific types of standard form contract 
terms such as terms of public transport and terms of contracts for 
telecommunications become a part of the contract even without notice or 
sign, as long as the other party agrees to their application.    
 
Another exception to § 305(2) BGB provides § 305b BGB. 
According to this provision, individually negotiated terms take priority over 
standard form contract terms. This provision is applicable where a 
standard form contract term is inconsistent with an individually negotiated 
term of the same contract.    
 
The most important exception to § 305(2) BGB can be seen in the 
provision of § 305c BGB. The first part of this provision states that 
surprising terms do not become part of the contract, even if the parties 
have complied with the requirements of § 305(2) BGB.76  The second part 
of § 305c BGB contains the German version of the contra proferentem rule 
and provides that ambiguous terms are to be construed against the user. It 
is in the hands of the drafter to formulate clear terms, he therefore should 
not profit from his own poor drafting.77     
 
 
3.  Content Control of Standard Form Contract Terms 
The heart of the German law on standard form contracts is its control of 
the content of standard terms. At a glance, it consists of three parts: § 307 
BGB as general clause prohibiting standard terms that are unreasonable 
and contrary to the requirements of good faith; § 308 BGB as a list of 
standard terms that may be prohibited subject to a default reasonableness 
test; and § 309 BGB as a list of terms that are prohibited and therefore 
invalid per se. These three provisions are to be applied in the following 
order: Firstly, one has to check if the challenged term is contained in the 
“black list” of § 309 BGB; then, if the challenged term is part of the “grey 
                                                 
76 For further details see below chapter 5 A I. 
77 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 350. 
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list” of § 308 BGB; finally if the term is unreasonable and contrary to the 
requirements of good faith according to § 307 BGB.78  
 
a.  § 309 BGB 
§ 309 BGB provides a list of prohibited standard form contract terms. More 
specifically, it lists thirteen types of prohibited terms. Prohibited in this 
context means that a term, which is contained in list of § 309 BGB, is 
invalid without undergoing an evaluation. There is no further need for the 
courts to review the content of the term.79  § 309 BGB is considered to be 
an application of the general clause of § 307 BGB and addresses specific 
terms, which by experience are often included in standard form 
contracts.80  § 309 BGB intends to increase legal certainty by providing 
such a specific list.81  The extent to which the provision has achieved this 
is debatable.  
 
In detail, § 309 BGB addresses standard form contract terms about 
price increases at short notice; the right to refuse to perform; a prohibition 
of set-off; notices and periods for performance; lump-sum claims for 
damages; penalties; exclusions of liability for death, injury to body and 
health and for gross fault; exclusions of liability in the event of other 
breaches of duty; a period of recurring obligations; the change of a 
contract partner; the liability of an agent on the conclusion of the contract; 
the burden of proof; and the form of notices and declarations.  
 
  
b.  § 308 BGB 
If a term does not fall under § 309 BGB, it has to be tested under § 308 
BGB. This provision complements § 309 BGB and is also considered to be 
an application of the general clause of § 307 BGB. It also addresses 
specific terms, which by experience are often included in standard form 
                                                 
78 For further reading on this procedure see for example O Jauernig Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, Kommentar 10ed (München: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2003) § 307 at 312 para 1.  
79 See for example Maxeiner (note 36) at 153. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
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contracts.82  Contrary to § 309 BGB, if a term falls under § 308 BGB, it is 
tested under specified measures. It is not invalid per se, but lists eight 
types of terms that are suspected to be invalid. It requires a value 
judgement of the particular standard term, i.e. an evaluation of its impact 
on the consumer party under the specific circumstances.83   
 
In detail, § 308 BGB lists standard form contract terms about the 
period for acceptance or performance; an additional period for 
performance; the right of termination of the contract; the right of 
amendment of the promised performance; fictitious declarations; fictional 
receipts; winding-up of contracts; and an unavailability of the object of 
performance.  
 
 
c.  § 307 BGB 
Because it is never sufficient against the ingenuity of contract drafter who 
will find new ways to unfairly favour their own interests, § 307 BGB 
contains a general clause invalidating standard form contract terms, which 
violate the notion of good faith.84  Accordingly, standard terms not caught 
by § 309 BGB or § 308 BGB are subject to an evaluation under the § 307 
BGB standard.85
 
§ 307 BGB operates to place limits on the extent to which the user 
of standard from contracts, mostly a businessperson, may take advantage 
of the notion of freedom of contract.86  A provision in standard terms is 
thereby invalid if it places the contractual partner of the user at an 
unreasonable disadvantage and therefore is contrary to the requirement of 
good faith. By finding out if a term is contrary to good faith, the courts 
                                                 
82 Ibid. 
83 Bates (note 44) at 62. 
84 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 359. 
85 For a detailed illustration of the evaluation under § 307 BGB see below chapter 5 A III 
1. 
86 Bates (note 44) at 60. 
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determine whether the user of the term has one-sidedly exploited over 
drafting.87  
 
§ 307(2) BGB thereby provides guidelines for the courts to assume 
an unreasonable disadvantage under specific circumstances. § 307(2) No 
1 BGB presumes an unreasonable disadvantage if a standard term makes 
a material departure from a fundamental principle of otherwise applicable 
law. § 307(2) No 2 BGB presumes an unreasonable disadvantage if the 
standard terms takes away or limits a material benefit that the contract is 
designed to provide.  
 
 
4.  General Rules of German Private Law Governing Standard Form 
Contracts  
The above-mentioned specific provisions governing standard form 
contracts are not the exclusive source.88  Additionally, other rules of 
private law, such as fraud, incapacity, illegality and mistake also apply.89  
The afore-stated rules will not be discussed as they are beyond the focus 
of this dissertation. 
 
 
5.  Legal Consequences of Non-Incorporation and Invalidity of 
Standard Form Contract Terms 
If a standard form contract term falls under the list of prohibited terms of § 
309 BGB, the term is invalid. Such a term is also invalid, if it is tested 
under § 308 BGB and valued to be prejudicial to the consumer. Finally, a 
standard form contract term is invalid if it is contrary to the requirement of 
good faith according to § 307 BGB. These consequences arises directly 
out of the provisions §§ 307-309 BGB.    
 
                                                 
87 Maxeiner (note 36) at 147. 
88 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 341-342 
89 Ibid. 
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§ 306 BGB provides for the destiny of the (remaining) contract: 
Where standard form contract terms have not become part of the contract 
according to §§ 305(2) – 305c BGB or are invalid according to §§ 307-309 
BGB, the content of the contract is determined by the statutory rules (§ 
306(2) BGB). In that case, the remainder of the contract continues to be 
valid (§ 306(1) BGB), unless one party would suffer unreasonable 
hardship bound by it (§ 306(3) BGB). In such case the whole contract is 
invalid.      
 
 
II.  Procedural Provisions of German Law on Standard Form 
Contracts       
The German procedural provisions of standard term contract law govern 
procedures to be taken in case of invalid standard terms and complement 
the substantive provisions of the German standard form contract law. They 
are contained in the UklaG and, to give a brief outline, provide for a 
“positive enforcement”, i.e. measures designed to prevent the use of unfair 
standard terms. 
 
More specifically, Germany operates with the procedural solution of 
institutional action (Verbandsklage). § 1 UklaG sets up a procedure for 
certain consumer organisations, commercial associations and trade 
associations to bring an action against those who use or recommend use 
of illegal standard terms for discontinuance or retraction. Individual 
consumers cannot initiate an action under § 1 UklaG; only qualified 
consumer organisations, trade associations or commercial groups are 
entitled to use § 1 UklaG against the user of illegal standard terms. In 
order to qualify as such a consumer organisation, the organisation must 
have legal capacity and exist for the purpose of providing consumers with 
information and advice (§ 3(1) UklaG). These requirements clearly limit the 
potential number of claimants and therefore to some extent reduce the 
general availability of the institutional action as means of consumer 
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protection.90  This limitation illustrates that the institutional action 
procedure exists to protect the contracting public rather than individual 
consumers from an unfair use of standard terms. Nevertheless, individual 
consumers have the possibility to report the use of illegal standard terms 
to qualified organisations that are entitled to initiate an action according to 
§ 1 UklaG. Additionally, they still have the opportunity to bring an ordinary 
action against the user of illegal standard form contract terms. 
 
However, most legal complaints about unfair standard form contract 
terms do not require judicial involvement.91  Besides the possibility of 
institutional action itself, the collective procedure of the UklaG allows 
consumer organisations to pursue users of unfair contract terms in other 
ways.92  Although not established in the UklaG itself, warning letters 
issued by the consumer organisations have proven very effective on 
achieving compliance with the UklaG.93  Such letters to the users of unfair 
contract terms demand the discontinuation of the use of such terms and 
threaten judicial action against the users unless they voluntarily agree to 
stop using the invalid term.94  As a consequence, many users voluntarily 
agree to discontinue using the terms. Additionally, in order to provide 
adequate security against a relapse, the user gives a promise to stop 
doing something and to incur a penalty for non-compliance (strafbewährte 
Unterlassungserklärung).95  This is a legally binding agreement stating 
that the use of the unfair term ceases.96  
 
Back to the UklaG, § 6 UklaG provides that one ordinarily must sue 
in the defendant’s home jurisdiction. In order to make it easier for the 
consumer organisations, it further provides that, if the defendant is not 
located in Germany, the plaintiff may sue in any district where the invalid 
standard form contract term is used.  
                                                 
90 Bates (note 44) at 63. 
91 Maxeiner (note 36) at 156. 
92 Bates (note 44) at 64-66.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Maxeiner (note 36) at 158. 
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As an additional sanction § 7 UklaG provides that a judgment 
decided in favour of the plaintiff, is to be published. Therefore the user of 
invalid terms risk more than just loosing a trial. Namely, they risk having 
their name published in a list that everybody can have a look at. 
Accordingly, such users have their good reputation to loose, which creates 
an additional sanction.  
 
§§ 9 and 11 UklaG give the institutional action its real threat. 
According to § 9 UklaG, a judgment against the user of unfair contract 
terms must recite the invalid term, identify the type of transaction in which 
its use by the defendant is prohibited, and prohibit the use of terms having 
the same content. Ordinarily, a judgment in Germany has effect only for 
the parties to the trial. Contrary to this, § 11 UklaG changes this rule and 
gives the judgment a broader effect. According to this provision, terms 
found invalid in an institutional action are invalid with respect to all of the 
users’ customers. The users, should they fail to comply with the judgment 
and continue to use the invalid terms, are subject to fines or imprisonment 
under § 890 of the Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure, 
hereinafter ZPO).           
  
 
B.  History of the German Law on Standard Form Contracts 
The German legal system has long provided some control over the use of 
standard form contract terms.97  South African lawyers view contract law in 
South Africa as judge-made law, whilst perceiving Germany as a country 
of legislation. However, for three quarters of the twentieth century, 
German law on standard form contracts was also judge-made. Finally, 
Germany legislated this area of law in the 1970s. This final section of 
chapter 3 deals with the history of the German law on standard form 
contracts and its development from case law into codified law. The 
                                                 
97 Maxeiner (note 36) at 142.  
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German history is useful in determining whether South Africa should 
introduce legislation to this judge-made area of law.  
 
In Germany, standard form contracts achieved widespread use by 
the end of the nineteenth century.98  Especially since the First World War 
insurance companies, banks, large firms, and associations started to 
rationalise their business.99  They abandoned the practise of tailoring 
contracts to the individual consumer and started to adopt predrafted and 
standardised contract terms.100   
 
First, German courts refused to challenge such standard form 
contracts. They held that freedom of contract precludes them from 
intervening to control standard form contracts no matter how unfair the 
contained terms might be.101  However, when the German Civil Code 
(BGB) came into force in 1900, it provided a statutory basis for an 
intervention, especially with its provisions §§ 138 and 242 BGB. With 
these two general clauses, German courts started through the 1930s to 
challenge the validity of unfair standard form contract terms and 
formulated special rules to be applied in cases dealing with such terms.102  
§ 138(1) BGB states:  
 
‘A transaction that offends good morals is void.’  
 
Thereby “offend good morals” can be equated to “unconscionable”.103  § 
242 BGB states: 
 
‘Obligations shall be performed in the manner required by good faith, with regard to 
commercial usage.’    
 
                                                 
98 Ibid.  
99 Horn, Kötz and Leser (note 7) at 88. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Maxeiner (note 36) at 142. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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In the beginning, German courts applied the good morals provision 
of § 138 BGB to police standard terms. Standard form contract terms were 
struck down in situations where one party took advantage of its monopoly 
position and the other party had no choice but to accept them.104  That 
resulted in a situation contra bonos mores according to § 138 BGB. It was 
argued that in situations where the user of standard form contract terms 
could use his economic power to dictate one-sided and unfair terms to the 
inferior party, freedom of contract needed some supplementary 
protection.105  In order to remedy this imbalance the courts intervened and 
held that unfair contract terms must be construed in favour of the weaker 
party, i.e. the consumer.106  
 
Later, the Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court, 
hereinafter BGH) shifted from relying on the good morals provision of § 
138 BGB to applying the good faith provision of § 242 BGB.107  This 
change permitted the judicial control to be made in detail, correcting only 
specific terms of a contract and leaving the rest of the contract valid as 
is.108  This was not possible under § 138 BGB. 
 
§ 242 BGB, despite its unimpressive look, is one of the most 
astonishing phenomena of the BGB.109  The general clause requiring that 
obligations shall be performed in a manner according to good faith is a 
super control norm for the entire BGB.110  It is entirely a product of judicial 
decisions, with the sprawl and disorder that can be found in case law and 
rapidly growing and changing.111  The importance of the provision of good 
faith lies in its function on giving legal force to ethical values of society.112  
Concerning standard form contracts, § 242 BGB has been used to monitor 
                                                 
104 This view was taken by the Reichsgericht (Supreme Court of the German Empire, 
hereinafter RG), for example 62 RGZ at 264; 103 RGZ at 82.  
105 Horn, Kötz and Leser (note 7) at 88. 
106 Ibid. 
107 BGH 22 BGHZ at 90. 
108 JP Dawson ‘Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version’ (1976) 89 Harvard LR 
1041 at 1109. 
109 Horn, Kötz and Leser (note 7) at 135.  
110 Ibid.  
111 Dawson (note 108) at 1110.  
112 Horn, Kötz and Leser (note 7) at 137. 
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the exercise of rights of the contracting parties.113  Thus, to be valid, 
standard form contract terms could not be contrary to the transactional 
expectations of the non-drafting party and could not unfairly advantage the 
user of the terms.114
 
In detail, it firstly was argued that the consumer is only bound to the 
standard form contract terms with which he should fairly and justly 
reckon.115  Accordingly, the consumers should be protected against unfair 
surprise by terms in a place where they would not be expected.116  This 
was explained as follows:117  Standard form contract terms replace non-
mandatory provisions of the BGB. These provisions nevertheless 
represent a legislative value judgement as how normal transaction should 
work. The drafter and user of deviating standard form contract terms, in 
making “new law” concerning certain transactions, therefore has a special 
responsibility to ensure that any deviating consequences are both fully 
understood and not unfairly one-sided in favour of himself.   
 
Another motive of policing standard form contracts was called the 
denaturing of the transaction.118  In altering the content of the contractual 
transaction by replacing the relevant non-mandatory provision of the BGB, 
often a provision on the burden of proof of damage or injury, by standard 
form contract terms the protection the transaction pretended to give is 
often made illusory.119  Since the consumer would seldom have the means 
to proof the relevant facts, it was considered unfair and against food faith 
(§ 242 BGB) to let them carry this burden.120
 
                                                 
113 Horn, Kötz and Leser (note 7) at 138.  
114 For a discussion of early attempts by the German Courts to address standard form 
contract problems see also: Dawson (note 108).  
115 Dawson (note 108) at 1110. 
116 See for example BGH 60 BGHZ at 243. 
117 BGH 1965 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 265. 
118 See for example the decisions of the BGH 1971 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 
1036; BGH 41 BGHZ at 151.  
119 Ibid. 
120 BGH 41BGHZ at 151.  
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The most remarkable feature of the BGH’s approach to standard 
form contracts was that it did not make any inquiries into the degree to 
which the individual’s consent had been impaired.121  Whether he or she 
was coerced, had read the form or not or lacked bargaining power was not 
relevant in the decision about the validity of standard form contract 
terms.122  The court’s role was rather to evaluate the transaction in 
broader terms, so as to dispense elementary contractual justice for the 
large, undefined group of individuals who have to agree to the terms than 
to make justice in individual cases.123  Accordingly, they were required to 
balance out the interests of the user of the standard form contract terms 
against those of numerous unknown but potential individuals, some of 
whom might be severely deprived; if there could be some the particular 
term was held invalid.124  
 
In addition to setting the standards of policing standard form 
contract terms, the above mentioned decisions of the BGH in the 1950s 
and 1960s set in motion broader changes in thinking that ended with the 
Gesetz zur Regelung von Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, 1976 
(Standard Contract Terms Act, hereinafter AGBG).       
  
As response to the consumer protection movement, in the early 
1970s both sides of the German legislative aisle125  agreed that it was time 
for legislation on standard form contracts.126  Accordingly, the AGBG 
finally entered into force on April 1, 1977. This Act basically turned over 
twenty years of the judge-made law into a statute. Thus, the in the first 
part of this chapter illustrated provisions reflect the German case law prior 
to the enactment of AGBG.127  
 
                                                 
121 Dawson (note 108) at 1113. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid.  
124 For example BGH 52 BGHZ at 86. 
125 The German legislative organs are the Bundestag (parliament) and the Bundesrat 
(federal assembly). Typically these two sides of the legislative aisle do not easily reach 
an agreement on new legislation.   
126 Maxeiner (note 36) at 144. 
127 Bates (note 44) at 18. 
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The AGBG quickly assumed a central role in German contract 
law.128  From 1977 to 1999 the BGH alone dealt with more than 1500 
cases dealing with standard form contracts.129  The AGBG remained a 
separate statute until January 1, 2002. Then, in the course of the 
Schuldrechtsreform (reform of the German Law of Obligations), the 
substantive provisions of the AGBG were incorporated in the BGB, and its 
procedural provisions became part of a new procedural statute, the UklaG. 
However, in their 27-year life, the provisions on standard form contracts 
experienced no major amendments. The law is widely regarded as a 
success.130               
                                                 
128 O Remien ‘AGB-Gesetz und Richtlinie über mißbrauchliche 
Verbrauchervertragsklauseln in  ihrem europäischen Umfeld’ 1994 Zeitschrift fuer 
Europaeisches Privatrecht 34.
129 Maxeiner (note 38) at 149. 
130 See Maxeiner (note 38) at 149 with further references to that statement. 
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Chapter Four 
South African Law on Standard Form Contracts 
 
Contrary to German law, in South African law one can find no general 
legislation on unfair contract terms; especially no legislation on standard 
form contracts. However, it cannot be said that the South African 
consumer is completely unprotected. Parliament has enacted protective 
legislation as, for example, the Price Control Act, 1964131,  the Limitation 
and Disclosure of Finance Charges Act, 1968132,  the Alienation of Land 
Act, 1981133,  the Rent Control Act, 1976134,  the Credit Agreement Act, 
1980135,  the Gauteng Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act, 
1996136  and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 2000137.  But these statutes tackle the problem of 
unfair contract terms piecemeal and lack a unifying principle.138  
Therefore, they can only be seen as a supplement to a general solution of 
the problem of unconscionability.139  
 
Regarding the abuse of standard form contracts, the South African 
consumer protection is only provided by common law rules. These rules 
do not aim at standard form contracts as a specific type of contract; they 
are rather general rules which govern the conclusion and terms of all 
contracts. Nevertheless, in the context of standard form contracts they are 
of great importance.  
 
Due to this lack in consumer protection there is the suggestion that 
general legislation on unfair contract terms should be introduced. The 
South African Law Commission’s project 47 was set up to investigate 
                                                 
131 Act 25 of 1964. 
132 Act 73 of 1968. 
133 Act 68 of 1981. 
134 Act 80 of 1976. 
135 Act 75 of 1980. 
136 Act 7 of 1996. 
137 Act 4 of 2000. 
138 TG Winkler Consumer Law and Unfair Contract Terms, The Austrian Answer to a 
Worldwide Challenge (LLM-Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1986/87) at 62. 
139 Ibid. 
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whether legislation on this area of law is necessary.140  As a result, the 
Law Commission’s proposal, contained in its report of April 1998, is a 
comprehensive statute called the “Control of Unreasonableness, 
Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms Act”.141  
 
In this chapter, I will first illustrate the current South African case 
law on standard form contracts / unfair contract terms. The second section 
will outline its history. This will be followed by an overview of the Law 
Commission’s proposal, i.e. the “Control of Unreasonableness, 
Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms Act”.  
    
 
A.  Current South African Law on Standard Form Contracts / Unfair 
Contract Terms       
The common law has developed many principles and rules to limit 
unfairness in the process of concluding a contract and as well as limiting 
unfairness within the contract terms itself.142  These rules can be divided 
into three different categories. The first category contains rules of 
construction of the contract. The second category contains rules of narrow 
interpretation of contract terms. Finally, the third group can be described 
as limiting the enforcement of unfair contract terms on the grounds of 
public policy.      
 
 
I.  Scope of Application of the South African Law on Standard Form 
Contracts / Unfair Contract Terms 
Generally, the South African common law rules in standard form contracts 
/ unfair contract terms apply to all contracts. Thus, they are not limited to 
consumer contracts only. They apply to consumer contracts, i.e. 
transactions between suppliers who act in the course of business and 
individuals who require the services or goods for private use or 
                                                 
140 Christie (note 57) at 14. 
141 Christie (note 57) at 15. 
142 Christie (note 57) at 16. 
 34 
 
consumption.143  Furthermore, they apply to commercial contracts, i.e. to 
transactions between parties who are engaged in business, trade or 
industry and act in the course of the business.144  
 
 
II.  Rules of Construction 
Concerning the rules of construction one has to distinguish between 
signed und unsigned documents. 
 
1.  Signed documents 
Generally, a person who signs a contractual document (e.g. a standard 
form contract) thereby signifies consent to the contents of the 
document.145  This general principle of law is described as the caveat 
subscriptor rule and has been expressed in Burger v Central as follows: 
  
‘It is a sound principle of law that a man, when he signs a contract, is taken to be 
bound by the ordinary meaning and effect of the words which appear over his 
signature. There are, of course, grounds upon which he may repudiate a document to 
which he has to put his hand.’146  
 
These ‘grounds’ include fraud, undue influence, duress, misrepresentation 
and mistake. However, if such grounds do not exist and the terms included 
in the signed document then turn out to be disliked the signing person has 
no one to blame but him- or herself.  
 
The basis of the caveat subscriptor rule is, however, not like it 
sometimes was expressed, a rebuttable presumption that a person who 
puts his signature to a document knows what the document contains.147  
                                                 
143 H Silberberg ‘The Meaning of Standard Form Contracts’ 1967 Rhodes LJ 158 at 172. 
144 JL Van Dorsten  A Consideration of Certain Aspects of Standard Form Contracts and 
Exemption  Clauses (LLM-Dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1981) Part I at 16.   
145 Christie (note 57) at 199. 
146 SAR 1903 TS 571 at 578. 
147 Christie (note 57) at 199. Cases see for example Graff-Reinet Municipality v Jansen 
1917 CPD 604 at 610.  
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The true basis of this principle rather is the doctrine of quasi-mutual 
assent.148  
 
Nevertheless, the South African common law on contracts does 
seek to protect weak parties against stronger ones. Thus, in exceptional 
cases South African courts limit the caveat subscriptor rule to achieve 
such protection of the weaker party.149  
 
 
2.  Unsigned Documents – The “Ticket Cases” 
For some suppliers, obtaining of a signature from each customer is 
impracticable.150  Contracts in the fields of public entertainment, sports 
promotion and passenger transport require such to be concluded without 
obtaining a signature.151  
 
The common law has evolved a set of certain rules to make the 
obtaining of a signature in order to conclude a contract unnecessary. 
These rules apply to all cases where a supplier places before the 
customer a document which contains or refers to the terms the supplier 
requires to include in the contract and which is not intended to be signed – 
the “ticket cases”.152  These cases are especially relevant for the law on 
standard form contracts as they represent an important portion of them.  
 
In an ideal case, the customer reads and understands the terms of 
the document. By going ahead with the contract (e.g. with boarding the 
train or entering the cinema), he binds himself to it, because he consents 
to them or because the supplier is reasonably entitled to assume the 
consent from the behaviour.153  The customer is bound to the terms if it is 
                                                 
148 Christie (note 57) at 200; approved in Dlovo v Brian PorterMotors Ltd 1994 (2) SA 518 
(C) at 524 D-E. 
149 For a detailed illustration of such exceptions see chapter 5 A II 2.  
150 Christie (note 57) at 204. 
151 Ibid.  
152 Ibid.  
153 Ibid.  
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proved that he read them.154  In this case it is not necessary to go further, 
an understanding of the terms in order to bind the customer is 
assumed.155  
 
If there is no proof that the customer read the document he will 
nevertheless be bound if the supplier did what was reasonable sufficient, 
necessary or possible, to draw the customer’s attention to the terms 
contained in or referred to in the contractual document.156 Thus, the 
supplier of standard form contract terms has to take reasonable steps to 
draw the customer’s attention to the terms at the time of concluding the 
contract. What steps are reasonable is a question depending on the 
particular circumstances of each case.157  However, some principles can 
be extracted from previous cases: 
 
‘The more contractually obscure or incidental the document, the less likely it is to 
expect it to contain contractual provisions and the more specific and positive must the 
steps be which are taken to bring to the attention of the other party. Per contra in the 
case of carriage tickets and bills of lading, where long established usage has created 
a situation where a contracting party, even an ordinary member of the public, will be 
taken to be aware of the existence of such provisions on the relevant document, or at 
least a reference thereto, and to have knowledge thereof.’158         
 
To be binding, the document does not necessarily have to come 
into the hands of the customer.159  Generally, it is sufficient if the 
document with its terms is available for inspection.160       
 
 
III.  Rules of Narrow Interpretation 
                                                 
154 Essa v Divaris 1947 (1) SA 753 (A) at 763. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Christie (note 57) at 205. 
157 Christie (note 57) at 207.  
158 Bok Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v Lady Land Ltd 1982 (2) SA 565 (C) at 569 E-
G. 
159 Christie (note 57) at 208. 
160 See for example Davidson v Johannesburg Turf Club 1904 TH 260 at 265; Durban’s 
Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) Sa 982 (A) at 992 A-D. 
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Even where an unfair contractual term is imposed in accordance with the 
above-mentioned rules of construction, its oppressive effect can be 
mitigated to some extent by the rules or principles of restricted or narrow 
interpretation.161
 
In this course, South African courts generally construe a contract 
term narrowly, where it imposes an undue hardship upon a person or 
where it deprives the person of common-law rights.162  Doing this, the 
courts try to place a light burden upon the weaker contractant or try to 
confine the exclusion of his right to the narrowest possible field.163  
 
The contra proferentem rule is often used to provide relief to 
persons affected by oppressive contract terms. This rule is based on the 
principle that a person is responsible for ambiguities in his own expression 
and provides that the words of a contract may be construed against the 
party who uses them.164  However, this rule should not be used unless all 
ordinary rules of interpretation to explore the true intention of the 
contracting parties have been exhausted.165  In the context of standard 
form contracts and contained unfair terms the contra proferentem rule is of 
a special importance because the party drafting and using an unfair 
contract terms often seeks to cover his unfair intentions though 
ambiguity.166
 
 
IV.  Rules Limiting the Enforcement of Unfair Contract Terms on the 
Grounds of Public Policy 
There are cases where a contract is concluded according to the above-
mentioned rules of construction and rules of narrow interpretation, but still 
                                                 
161 Aronstam (note 12) at 34.  
162 Ibid.  
163 Ibid. 
164 Aronstam (note 12) at 35.  
165 Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co Ltd 1948 (3) SA 99 (AD) at 123.  
166 Aronstam (note 12) at 36.  
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affect the public interest. In these cases, the South African courts may 
strike down contract terms that are contrary to public policy.167
 
Writing about the role of public policy in policing standard form 
contracts requires firstly a definition of this vague expression. Generally, 
public policy expresses the interest of the community.168  It is a general 
legal norm that dictates what society views as appropriate. Public policy is 
static and changes as society’s views change. A legal embodiment of 
public policy is expressed in the bill of right in the Constitution and in well-
established legal principles in case law.  
 
In contract law, public policy expresses what society expects and 
tolerates concerning the conclusion of a contract, its content and 
enforcement. More specifically, public policy demands in general full 
freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect 
of all legitimate subject matters.169  Accordingly, South African’s courts 
generally uphold the notion of freedom of contract and refuse to interfere 
with contractual terms, however harsh they are.170  Nevertheless, 
nowadays there is a trend to interpret public policy not only in terms of the 
society’s interest in upholding freedom of contract, but also in terms of the 
interests of the individual contractant.171  
 
In their decisions, courts rely on the corrective function of the iustus 
error doctrine as well as on the possibility of a restrictive interpretation, 
whereby public policy emerges as a corrective doctrinal control 
mechanism.172  Considerations such as good faith and reasonableness 
are also taken into account. Thereby, good faith operates only 
                                                 
167 For a detailed illustration of substantive control in South African law see below chapter 
5 A III.  
168 Law Union v Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael’s Executor 1917 AD 593 at 598.  
169 Ibid. 
170 See for example Oatorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v Maroun 1973 (3) Sa 779 at 785. 
171 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 275.  
172 See for example Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 847 (A); 
Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 SCA; Afrox 
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom  2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA). 
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indirectly.173  Moreover, the determination whether a contract term is 
contrary to public policy or not has to be informed by values of the 
Constitution.174  
 
It can be noticed that generally South African courts are unwilling to 
lay down guidelines as to what is conscionable in a contract or 
economically and socially desirable. Whether a contract term is extremely 
unfair und therefore contrary to public policy, is a question of a value-
judgement in each particular case. However, it is possible to extract a 
series of rules from the case law: One area in which courts exercise their 
power to restrict the freedom of contract relates to the use of restraint of 
trade clauses in contracts of employment and sales of goodwill.175  Such 
clauses might be declared invalid because they deprive a person of his 
right to earn a living in the occupation of his choice.176  Public policy is 
also the basis upon which the courts strike down clauses, which exclude 
liability for any criminal act done in connection with the performance of the 
contract177  or any intentional breach of contract.178  Moreover, an 
exemption clause excluding liability for gross negligence may also be 
against public policy.179  
 
In the analysis undertaken in the Afrox case concerning the issue of 
public policy, it was held that three grounds could lead to the invalidity of 
an exemption clause: firstly, the inequality of bargaining power of the 
parties at the time of conclusion of the contract (only in conjunction with 
other factors); secondly, the nature and scope of the exemption from 
liability which the clause afforded to the appellant rendered it 
objectionable; and thirdly the possibility that the clause infringes 
                                                 
173 Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) at 15 E. 
174 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) at 37 D-E. 
175 See for example the leading case Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 
(note 172).  
176 See also Van den Pol v Silbermann & another 1952 (2) SA 561 (AD). 
177 Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69. 
178 See for example East London Municipality v South African Railways & Harbours 1951 
(4) SA 466 (E); Government of the Republic of South Africa v Fibre Spinners & Weavers 
(Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 794 (A). 
179 See Afrox case (note 172) generally.   
 40 
 
constitutional rights which public policy by virtue of sec 39(2) of the 
Constitution requires to promote.180  However, in the end the Afrox case 
upheld the traditional view that public policy generally as well as in that 
particular case favoured the sanctity of contract.181       
 
 
V.  General Rules of South African Contract Law Governing Standard 
Form Contracts  
Besides the above mentioned common law rules governing standard form 
contracts, other rules of the South African contract law, such as fraud, 
incapacity and illegality also apply. However, these rules will not be 
discussed as they are beyond the aims of this paper. 
 
 
VI.  Unenforceability and Severability of Invalid Contract Terms 
If an unfair contract term or the whole contract is found invalid on the 
grounds of public policy, it is unenforceable.182  
 
In this context the question appears what happens to the remainder 
if only one contract term is found invalid. The general rule is that the court 
may not make a contract for the parties.183  However, to answer the above 
mentioned question, one firstly has to ask whether the term in question is 
severable from the remainder of the contract. In order to determine that, it 
has to be examined whether the elimination of the invalid part still leaves 
the substantial character of the contract unchanged.184  Facts taken into 
consideration inculde the terms of the contract as well as its nature and 
surrounding circumstances185,  and the intention of the parties to remain 
bound186.  If the result is that the remainder of the contract still has the 
substantial character of the original contract and the parties intended so, 
                                                 
180 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) at 35 A.  
181 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172). 
182 Christie (note 57) at 452. 
183 Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 at 264. 
184 Cameron v Bray Gibb & Co (Pvt) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 675 (R) at 676-677. 
185 Bhengu v Alexander 1947 (4) SA 341 (N) at 347. 
186 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 172) at 17 E-H. 
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the remainder may still be enforceable. However, public policy may even 
in these cases require that the entire contract is unenforceable.187  
 
 
VII.  Procedural Rules of South African Law on Standard Form 
Contracts / Unfair Contract Terms 
In South Africa, there exist no specific or written procedural rules 
concerning standard form contracts or unfair contract terms in general. 
Rather, the general litigation-based system of remedies applies. Any 
decision that declares an unfair contract term invalid has effect only for the 
specific parties to the trial. Persons who feel aggrieved by unfair contract 
terms have to institute an action in their own name against the user of the 
term in order to vindicate their rights.  
 
  
B.  History of the South African Law on Standard Form Contracts / 
Unfair Contract Terms 
The starting point in the South African law on standard form contracts / 
unfair contract terms always was and still is the principle that public policy 
demands in general full freedom of contract.188  Therefore, judges have 
been reluctant to use the common law as means to interfere with the 
process of the market place and stayed away from controlling contract 
terms.189  As a result, courts did not interfere with contracts or contract 
terms on the grounds that they were unreasonable.  
 
Nevertheless, it was generally assumed that the exception doli 
generalis provided a remedy against the enforcement of a contract in 
unfair circumstances.190  This rule applied whenever in the circumstances 
of a case the enforcement of a remedy by the user of an unfair contract 
term would cause great inequity and would amount to unconscionable 
                                                 
187 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 172) at 15 et seq. 
188 See for example Law Union v Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael’s Executor (note 
168) at 598. 
189E Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law: A Source Book vol 1, 2ed (Cape Town: Juta, 
1988) at 32. 
190 Christie (note 57) at 14-15.  
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conduct on the part of the user.191  However, the unexpected decision of 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas192  fully reviewed old 
and new authorities on the exception doli generalis and decided that this 
rule is not part of the South African contract law.  
 
Decisions in the eighties then started recognising public policy as 
corrective instrument for policing unfair contract terms. The case Magna 
Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis193  dealt with an agreement in 
restraint of trade. That agreement brought into conflict freedom of trade 
and pacta sunt servanda as two considerations that were relevant to 
public policy and made it necessary to weigh these up against each other. 
Also the second case, Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes194  gave due recognition 
to the treatment of public policy and that contract terms contrary to public 
policy are for that reason unenforceable.    
      
Finally, the cases Afrox195  and Brisley v Drosky196  recently 
recognised the obligation of the higher courts to develop the common law 
in order to give effect to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.  
 
 
C.  The Proposed “Control of Unreasonableness, 
Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts or Terms Act” 
After an extensive study of the law of other jurisdictions the South African 
Law Commission proposed in 1998 the so-called the “Control of 
Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts 
or Terms Act”.197  This proposed legislation has not been enacted yet.  
 
                                                 
191 See for example Zuurbekom Ltd v Union Corporation Ltd 1947 (1) SA 514 (AD) at 
537. 
192 1988 (3) SA 580 (A).  
193 See note 172.  
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 South African Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Project 47) Report (1998).  
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The proposed legislation provides a comprehensive judicial and 
executive branch regulation of unfair contract terms. It authorises courts to 
determine whether contractual terms are unreasonable, unconscionable or 
oppressive and to issue appropriate orders. Having determined that, the 
legislation furthermore authorises courts to void an entire contract or to 
limit its application (section 1(1) (d)). However, the “Control of 
Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in Contracts 
or Terms Act” does not define the phrase “unreasonable, unconscionable 
or oppressive”. Nevertheless, in its section 2 it provides 26 factors that the 
courts may rely on to determine the legality of a contract term. 
 
The scope of the proposed Act is broad. It applies to consumer as 
well as commercial contracts, except those contracts specifically 
exempted from the legislation (section 3). It covers the process of contract 
formation, the substance of the contract itself and post contract behaviour 
of the parties. Moreover, it applies to standard form contracts as well as to 
individually negotiated contracts.  
 
Thirdly, according to section 1(4) the proposed legislation provides 
for injunctive relief. Thus, the High Court is empowered to issue orders 
preventing a party from using a contract likely to contain an unreasonable, 
unconscionable or oppressive term. Any organisations, body or person is 
entitled to bring an action for injunctive relief. 
 
Finally, the proposed Act creates the office of an Ombudsperson in 
order to enforce the law (section 6). However, one must bear in mind that 
this Ombudsperson may consider any complaint on a non-negotiated 
contract term only (section 6(2) (a)). According to that section, a contract 
term is presumed to be non-negotiated where the contract has been 
drafted in advance and where the other party had no chance to influence 
the development of the questioned contract (term). The Ombudsperson 
has, under section 6(2), the following powers: (1) to require the user of the 
contract to provide all information necessary to assess the character of the 
contract; (2) to order a user to comply with the legislation; (3) to file an 
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action with the High Court against the user of an alleged unfair contract; 
and (4) to draft codes of conduct for particular industries or persons 
subject to approval of the Minister.    
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Part III 
Comparison and Evaluation 
 
Chapter Five 
Comparison 
 
A.  Detailed Comparison 
Generally, it can be noticed that both the German and the South African 
legal systems developed ways to protect the parties to a contract from 
unfair standard-from contract terms. Both systems, generally protecting 
and upholding the notion of freedom of contract, noticed the need for 
balancing out the competing interests between the notion of freedom of 
contract and restrictions to this freedom in order to prevent abuse in the 
form of unfair standard-from contract terms. 
 
To give a very brief outline, both legal systems, different in their 
general contract law as it is statutory law in Germany and case law in 
South African, are similar in their results to the problems discussed in this 
dissertation. It can be noticed that both legal systems, in order to protect a 
contractual party from unfair contract terms, have developed similar rules 
for determining whether a contract term is enforceable. Both in Germany 
and South Africa, the contractual parties have to fulfil certain requirements 
in order for making the questionable contract term a valid and enforceable 
part of the contract. Secondly, even where an unfair contract term is 
imposed in accordance with the above-mentioned requirements, its 
oppressive effect can affect the public interest to such extent that both 
jurisdictions declare it unenforceable. However, it can also be noticed that 
contracting individuals in South Africa are less protected from unfair terms 
than in Germany.  
 
This chapter of the dissertation compares the actual responses of 
the German and South African legal systems to the phenomenon of 
standard form contracts. The comparison has to be limited to the core 
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features of both legal systems, which are: (1) Scope of application of 
standard form contract law; (2) Incorporation / rules of construction; (3) 
Content control / rules limiting the enforcement of unfair contract terms; (4) 
Severability of invalid terms; (5) Procedural rules. After discussing the 
detailed comparison below, I will proceed to discuss specific 
consequences that follow forthwith. 
 
 
I.  Scope of Application of Standard Form Contract Law     
 
1.  Application to Standard Form Contract Terms only versus 
Application to Contract Terms in General 
As a first difference one can recognise the differing scope of application of 
the German and South African laws, which aim to protect the parties to a 
standard form contract. In Germany the relevant provisions of the Civil 
Code (BGB) apply to standard terms only (§ 305(1) BGB). According to § 
305(1) BGB, standard terms are all contractual terms pre-established for a 
multitude of contracts which one party to the contract (the user) presents 
to the other party upon the conclusion of the contract. Such terms do not 
constitute standard terms where they have been individually negotiated 
between the parties (§ 305(1) Sentence 3 BGB). In South African, there 
yet is no specific legislation governing the considered area of law. General 
common law rules covering all kinds of contracts apply. Such common law 
rules govern all areas of unfair contracts, i.e. unfairness in making the 
contract, unfair contracts and contract terms as well as unfair enforcement 
of a contract.198  No difference is made between standard form contracts 
and individually negotiated ones. Relevant for standard form contracts are 
the first two areas. Thus, only these areas are discussed in this 
dissertation. 
 
 
                                                 
198 For details see above chapter 4 A I. 
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2.  Differentiating between Consumer Contracts and Commercial 
Contracts / Enhanced Review of Consumer Contracts 
A further difference is that the German provisions concerning the scope of 
application, contrary to the general South African rules, distinguish 
between commercial contracts and consumer contracts. In Germany, 
standard form contract law protects mainly consumers. To fulfil this task, 
the German standard form contract law firstly restricts the scope of 
application of the standard form contract provisions for commercial 
contracts. Thus, § 305(2) and (3) BGB and §§ 308 and 309 BGB do not 
apply to standard terms which are proffered to a businessperson, a legal 
person governed by public law or a special fund governed by public law (§ 
310(1) BGB). Accordingly, only contracts which are proffered to a 
consumer have to pass the incorporation control of § 305(2) and (3) BGB 
and the content control of §§ 308 and 309 BGB. Consumer is thereby 
defined as a natural person who enters into a contract for non-commercial 
purposes, § 14 BGB. Nevertheless, § 310(1) BGB in the end only eases 
the requirements of the incorporation control. According to § 310(1) 
Sentence 2 BGB, the value judgments of §§ 308 and 309 BGB have to be 
considered in the evaluation under the § 307 BGB standard.199  Moreover, 
in this evaluation due regard must be paid to the customs and practices 
applying in business transactions (310(1) Sentence 2 BGB).  
 
Secondly, the German law on standard form contracts provides in § 
310(3) BGB an expanded protection that is available to consumers only. 
Thus, in consumer contracts standard terms are deemed to have been 
proffered by the businessperson (§ 310(3) No 1 BGB). That has the 
advantage for consumers that the standard form contract law applies even 
if third parties introduce standard terms to the contract, as long as the 
consumer could not influence their content.200  Insofar the protection for 
the consumer is extended, as § 305(1) BGB for the rest of the cases 
requires that one party to the contract (the user) presents the standard 
terms to the other party. Moreover, the standard form contract law 
                                                 
199 Jauernig (note 78) § 310 at 330 para 2.   
200 Jauernig (note 78) § 310 at 330 para 7.   
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provisions apply to pre-established conditions of consumer contracts even 
if they are intended for use only once, provided that the consumer could 
not influence their content (§ 310(3) No 2 BGB). Finally, the circumstances 
surrounding the conclusion of the particular contract are also to be taken 
into account when deciding whether there has been unreasonable 
detriment under § 307 BGB (§ 310(3) No 3 BGB). This constitutes a 
deviance to the circumstances taken into account in the examination 
under § 307 BGB. Courts usually are not supposed to concern themselves 
with the situation of individual parties, but focus on an abstract evaluation 
to determine if the standard terms are contrary to good faith. However, 
according to § 310(3) No 3 BGB courts concerned with a consumer 
contract additionally take the individual circumstances of the consumer 
into account.  
 
The exceptions of § 310(1) and (3) BGB show that the German law 
on standard form contracts distinguishes between commercial contracts 
and consumer contracts and provides extended protection where 
consumers are involved. Such a distinction cannot be found in South 
Africa. As mentioned earlier, here general common law rules covering all 
kinds of contracts apply. Such rules apply to standard form contracts and 
individually negotiated ones as well as to consumer contracts and 
commercial contracts.201  Therefore, extended protection for consumers is 
not provided, at least not explicitly. Although the relevant common law 
rules generally apply to all kinds of contracts, in the results there is not 
such a big difference between the German and South African scope of 
application of standard form contract law. As shown above, the South 
African courts evaluate in the individual case if an intervention is 
necessary in order to protect one contractual party from the oppressive 
behaviour of the other one. Many problems the South African rules aim to 
solve do not occur when the contract is individually negotiated or only 
businesspersons enter into it. The problem of unfairness in terms, 
resulting from a situation where one contractual party is superior and the 
                                                 
201 For details see above chapter 4 A I. 
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other one inferior because of a lack in bargaining power just does not arise 
if the parties to a contract are in an equal position like for example 
contracting business people.202  The situation where for example a 
customer has no option but to use the services of the post office, the 
railway or the electricity provider and therefore does not have the 
possibility of negotiation about the terms of the particular contract usually 
exists for consumers only. Moreover, these are typical situations where 
standard form contracts and not individually negotiated ones are used. 
Therefore, it is argued that South African courts usually see the necessity 
for action only in these situations. Accordingly, they restrict the 
enforceability of unfair contracts terms in situations only where also the 
German law on standard form contracts applies.  
 
As a result one can say that although the South African scope of 
application of standard form contract law is formally wider than the 
German one, the end results practically do not differ. In Germany the 
scope of application is restricted to certain situations, while in South Africa 
the courts restrict the enforceability of a contract only in exactly these 
similar or similar ones.    
 
 
II.  Incorporation Control versus Rules of Construction  
Also the German provisions about the incorporation control of standard 
form contract terms come to similar results as the South African rules of 
construction. Both countries have developed certain requirements for 
(standard) contract terms in order to become a valid and enforceable part 
of the contract.   
 
In Germany, a standard term, in order to become valid and 
enforceable, has to fulfil certain requirements. Such requirements are laid 
down in § 305(2) BGB and followed by some exceptions stated in §§ 305a 
– 305c BGB. The South African rules of construction are similar. Just the 
                                                 
202 For a detailed illustration of the potential of abuse of contractual terms see above 
chapter 2 C. 
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starting point is a different one. While Germany states three requirements, 
which the user of standard terms has to fulfil ab initio in order to enforce 
such terms, South Africa generally requires only a signature of the party 
subject to such terms. As long as a signature exists, the person signing 
the contractual document is, as a matter of principle, bound.203  From this 
general rule, South African courts make certain exceptions in order to 
protect weak parties against strong ones.204
 
 
1.  The Role of Consent 
In detail, the first similarity is that both jurisdictions require some form of 
consent of the submitting party to the application of the (standard form) 
contract terms. Background of this requirement in Germany is the principle 
of consent (Konsensualprinzip). According to this principle, standard terms 
should not be unilaterally imposed on the submitting party; both parties to 
the contract should rather actually agree on their application.205  For 
achieving such an agreement, § 305(2) BGB states three requirements 
with the consent of the submitting party as one of them. Thereby, a 
party206  has to expressly or impliedly agree to the application of the terms. 
A signature is not necessary; it is sufficient if the user of the standard term 
can reasonable assume the consent.207  German law states two further 
requirements for the standard terms to be incorporated in the contract. As 
illustrated above, such further requirements are a notice of the application 
of standard form contract terms and a review opportunity.208  These two 
further requirements should ensure that standard terms are brought to the 
attention to the submitting party in order for this party to agree to their 
application, what is required by the principle of consent.209  
 
                                                 
203 The caveat subscriptor rule has firstly been expressed in Burger v Central SAR 1903 
TS 571.  
204 See also above chapter 4 A II. 
205 Jauernig (note 78) § 305 at 303 para 12. 
206 The submitting party in this context will be a consumer, because § 310(1) BGB 
excludes the application of § 305(2) BGB for commercial contracts.  
207 Jauernig (note 78) § 305 at 304 para 15. 
208 See above chapter 3 A I 2. 
209 Jauernig (note 78) § 305 at 303 para 12. 
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The three requirements of § 305(2) BGB have two effects: the party 
subject to the standard terms cannot avoid their application by simply not 
reading them; and the user of such terms cannot impose any terms 
without obtaining the other party’s consent and without giving him the 
opportunity to read them.210  These requirements thereby are contrary to 
the former German case law, that allowed, under certain circumstances, 
standard terms to become a part of the contract without notice or 
knowledge of the submitting party.211  This case law had been considered 
as dissatisfactory.212  Thus, the statutory provisions should ensure that the 
incorporation of standard terms in the contract happens in terms of 
general contractual provisions of the BGB.213  
      
Whereas as illustrated in Germany consent is only one of three 
requirements, it forms the starting point  in South Africa. Generally, a 
contract in South Africa requires either an actual meeting of the minds of 
the parties or the reasonable belief by one of them that there is 
consensus.214  According to the will theory, an actual meeting of the minds 
of the contractants, in other words consent, forms the basis of a 
contract.215  However, in some cases, such as standard form contract 
cases, an alternative basis for a contract is required. In such cases, due to 
the fact that an actual meeting of the minds hardly exists because the 
submitting party mostly does not understand or read the contract terms, a 
contract needs to have some other basis. According to the doctrine of 
quasi-mutual assent, a contract then is based on the intention of one party 
(the user of the terms) to an agreement and the reasonable impression on 
his part that the other part (the submitting party) had the same intention 
                                                 
210 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 355.  
211 See for example BGH 9 BGHZ at 1.   
212 See BT (Bundestag)-Drucksache (Report of the German Law Commission) 7/3919 at 
13. 
213 Ibid. In Germany, contract in general is an agreement between two parties consisting 
of two corresponding declaration of wills. Therefore, if one party does not know about 
some contract terms, they do not become part of the contract.   
214 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 16. For details about 
contract in general also see above chapter 2 D. 
215 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 19.  
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(reliance theory).216  The requirements for proving of a contract on this 
alternative basis are: (1) the creation of reliance by one party to the 
agreement that they have reached consent, and (2) the reasonability of 
the reliance in the circumstances.217            
 
As illustrated, South Africa, contrary to Germany, generally only 
requires some form of consent. This consent generally has to be given in 
writing, i.e. a signature. Accordingly, it is a matter of common knowledge 
and a general principle that a person who signs a contractual document 
thereby signifies his consent to the contractual terms.218  As illustrated 
above, this is expressed by the caveat subscriptor rule and sophisticated 
by the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent. According to the latter, a 
contractual party is reasonably entitled to assume that the other 
contractual party, the signatory, signifies his intention to be bound by 
signing the document, even after not reading it.219  Thus, it was held that if 
somebody puts his signature to a document he cannot fail to realise that 
signing he is giving his consent to whatever words are contained in the 
document.220  
 
However, from this general rule, South African courts make certain 
exceptions in order to protect weak parties against strong ones. In this 
course, they ensure that every contract term is brought to the attention of 
the weaker party. Thus, they set limits to the caveat subscriptor principle 
and the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent. They do so by applying the iustus 
error approach. According to this approach, a party who enters into a 
contract under a reasonable and material mistake is not bound.221  Then 
the other contractual party is no longer reasonably entitled to assume that 
the signing party signifies the intention to be bound. As a result, South 
                                                 
216 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 35. 
217 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 36.  
218 Christie (note 57) at 199. 
219 See for example: Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd (note 148) at 524 D-H; Fourie v 
Hansen [2000] 1 All SA 510 (W) at 516d-517a. 
220 George v Faimead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) at 472 A; see also Bhikhagee w 
Southern Aviation (Pty) Ltd 1949 (4) SA 105 (E) at 110; Mathole v Mothle 1951 (1) SA 
256 (T) at 259 D.  
221 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 39. 
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Africa ends up in having the same or similar requirements as the 
Germans.  
 
 
2.  The Requirements of the Principle of Consent versus Exceptions 
to the Caveat Subscriptor Rule   
In particular, in South Africa the caveat subscriptor rule is for example not 
applicable where the contractual terms are not contained in a document of 
such nature, as the reasonable person would expect it to contain such 
terms.222  Accordingly, a document that is merely a receipt for money paid 
or a voucher of that nature cannot be regarded as a contractual 
document.223  The document, rather, can be considered as evidence of a 
contract that has already taken place.224  German law achieves the same 
result with the aforementioned requirement that the user of standard terms 
has to give the other party notice of the application of such (§ 305(2) No 1 
BGB). Such notice must be given at the time of contracting and is not 
effective if made only once the contract is concluded.225  The same 
requirement was stated in the South African case Annie Peard v John T 
Rennie & Sons.226  
 
A further exception to the South African caveat subscriptor principle 
can be seen in the requirement of not presenting a contract inconsistent 
with a previous advertisement or previous representations during 
negotiations. Thus, in a case were a standard form contract contains a 
term allowing the user of the standard form contract to vary dates whereas 
a particular date was crucial in previous negotiations, it was held that the 
signatory should not bound as a result of a iustus error.227  Similarly, a 
term does not become part of the contract if the form or the document 
                                                 
222 Central South African Railways v McLaren 1903 TS 727 in general. 
223 Ibid. 
224 The exception was also applied in Frocks Ltd v Dent and Goodwin (Pty) Ltd 1950 (2) 
SA 717 (C). 
225 Palandt Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 62ed (München: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2003) § 305 at 
106 para 30. 
226 Annie Peard v John T Rennie & Sohns (1895) 16 NLR 175. 
227 Spindrifter (Pty) Ltd v Lester Donovan (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 303 (A) at 318 C. 
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confuses or misleads the signatory.228  For example, in the case Keens 
Group v Loetter229  the signatory signed a document headed by the words: 
‘Confidential: Application for Credit Facilities’ without reading the terms 
contained in it. It turned out that the terms of the document bound the 
signatory personally as a surety. This consequence did not appear from 
what was stated both at the beginning and immediately above the 
signature. In this case it was held that, because the attention of the 
signatory was not specifically attracted to the questionable terms and 
because these terms were not highlighted or made conspicuous in any 
way, the signatory could not reasonably expect to find such terms in the 
document.230  Therefore, the signatory successfully established iustus 
error and was not bound by his signature.231  Similarly, in the case Dlovo v 
Brian Porter Motors232  the signatory signed an agreement (‘job card’) 
authorizing certain car repairs. The document contained, printed in small 
print at the bottom of the job card and not brought to the attention of the 
signatory, an exemption clause. The court in this case held that there was 
no reason for doubt that the signatory signed under the impression that 
she was signing only a job card233.  She did not expect and did not have to 
expect an exemption clause as nobody draw her attention to such 
clause.234  Therefore, the signatory’s error in respect of the exemption 
clause was held iustus and she was held to be not bound by such 
clause.235  In the third case Fourie v Hansen236  the signatory signed a car 
hire agreement, which contained a term that excluded liability for damages 
for breach of the contract. The term was held to not be binding because of 
his surprising nature and because nobody drew the signatory’s attention to 
it.237       
                                                 
228 See for example Shepherd v Farrell’s Estate Agency 1921 TPD 62; Keens Group Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Loetter 1989 (1) SA 585 (C) at 590 B-592 C; Fourie v Hansen (note 219) at 
517a-f; Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd (note 148) at 524 C-527 D.   
229 Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Loetter (note 228). 
230 Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Loetter (note 228) at 591 B. 
231 Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Loetter (note 171) at 590 B-592 C. 
232 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd (note 148). 
233 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd (note 148) at 526 E-G. 
234 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd (note 148) at 526 I-J and 527 A-C. 
235 Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd (note 148) at 527 A-C. 
236 Fourie v Hansen  (note 219). 
237 Fourie v Hansen  (note 219) at 516i-517f. 
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These exceptions of the South African law to the caveat subscriptor 
rule are similar to the German provision § 305c(1) BGB. According to this 
provision, terms do not become part of the contract if they are of a 
surprising nature, even if the parties have complied with the requirements 
of § 305(2) BGB, § 305c(1) BGB. Under § 305c(1) BGB it is the term’s 
unusualness and not its unfairness that makes it void.238  Background of 
the provision is the assumption that the party subject to the standard form 
contract terms rarely reads the terms and should only be bound to the 
terms with which he should fairly and justly reckon.239  The factors taken 
into account in order to determine the term’s unusualness are similar to 
the findings in the aforementioned South African cases. In particular, a 
term is surprising if, under the circumstances, it is so unusual, in particular 
in view of its appearance in the document, that the other party would not 
expect it.240  Also negotiations prior to the conclusion of the contract have 
to be taken into account.241  
 
Further similarity between the German and South African law exists 
in cases where the submitting party does not sign the standard form 
contract (in South Africa the so-called ticket cases). As illustrated above, a 
signature in such cases is hard to obtain because the user (usually an 
enterprise) attracts so many customers at the same time to the same 
place that the requirement of a signature would lead to a costly and 
impracticable delay. Here the South African law requires, instead of a 
signature, some other form of consent. In these cases, consent is given 
impliedly (like it is possible in Germany under § 305(2) BGB). Briefly, the 
party subject to the standard terms becomes reads and understands such 
terms and is bound by going ahead with the contract (entering sports 
ground or boarding a train).242  If it cannot be proved that the party subject 
to the terms read them, this party will only be bound if the user did what 
                                                 
238 Jauernig (note 78) § 305c at 307 para 1. 
239 See BT (Bundestag)-Drucksache (Report of the German Law Commission) 7/3919 at 
19. 
240 Jauernig (note 78) § 305c at 307 para 2. 
241 BGH 2001 Der Betriebsberater at 2019. 
242 Pepler v Molteno School Board 1912 CPD 519; Smith v Carson 1916 EDL 26. 
 56 
 
was reasonable possible to draw the party’s attention to the terms 
contained in or referred to in the document.243  This requirement is similar 
to the three requirement stated in the German provision § 305(2) BGB. 
This provision applies for signed as well as unsigned documents and 
requires the user generally to give the other party notice of the application 
of standard terms. Depending on the circumstances, an express notice 
contained in the document or a sign is necessary, § 305(2) No 1 BGB.           
 
It can be followed that both jurisdictions try to make sure that 
(standard form) contract terms do not become part of the contract unless 
the party subject to the terms is aware of them and is provided with an 
opportunity to read them before the conclusion of the contract. Germany 
with its three requirements stated in § 305 (2) BGB that have to be fulfilled 
ab initio ends up in having the similar requirements as South Africa in 
order for the (standard form) contract terms to be part of the contract, 
which generally requires only consent but has developed certain 
exceptions and modifications.  
 
It is argued that the reason for the different starting points (resulting 
in similar conclusions) is once again that the South African common law 
rules applying to standard form contracts are general contract law 
principles, whereas Germany has tailored provisions. These tailored 
provisions codify previous case law as standard form contract law in 
Germany started off as case law. The structured German provisions on 
the incorporation of standard form contract terms benefit from the previous 
case law, while South Africa still is one step behind. 
 
 
III.  Content Control versus Rules Limiting the Enforcement of 
Standard Form Contracts / Unfair Contract Terms 
The third part of the comparison deals with the substantive control of 
(standard form) contract terms. It can be noticed that both the German and 
                                                 
243 Bok Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v Lady Land Ltd (note 158) at 569 E-G. For 
further details see above chapter 4 A II 2.  
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South African law on standard form contracts have found ways to limit the 
enforceability of contract terms that are successfully incorporated in the 
contract but unfairly disadvantage one contractual party. Thus, both 
jurisdictions accommodate the problems that typically occur in standard 
form contract cases and that are outlined above.244  Thereby both the 
German and South African law tried to keep the notion of freedom of 
contract intact. However, it can also be noticed that the approaches taken 
are different. Moreover, the extent of protection of the party subject to the 
standard form contract terms differs. 
 
 
1.  Means of Substantive Control 
The first difference is the means to review the content of standard form 
contract terms in both jurisdictions. German law focuses only on the 
content control, which in contained in the provisions §§ 307 – 309 BGB. 
As demonstrated above, German law uses a matrix approach to review 
the content of standard form contract terms.245  According to this matrix, 
one firstly has to check if the challenged term in contained in the list of § 
309 BGB. If yes, then it is invalid without a further review. Secondly, one 
has to check if the challenges term is part of the list of § 308 BGB. If yes, 
the term is not invalid per se, but suspected to be invalid and therefore 
subject to a value-judgement. Thirdly, the judges have to check if the term 
that is not contained in the lists of §§ 309 and 308 BGB is unreasonable 
and contrary to the requirements of good faith according to § 307 BGB.246
 
In this comparison the list of invalid and suspect terms contained in 
§§ 309 and 308 BGB shall be disregarded. These terms belong to the 
specific context of German law and society247;  a discussion would go 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. South African law has to make its 
own decisions about which terms offend the South African notion of 
                                                 
244 For details see chapter 1 and 2 above. 
245 Maxeiner (note 36) at 156.  
246 For a detailed explanation of this three-step procedure see for example Jauernig (note 
78) § 307 at 312 para 2. 
247 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 358. 
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fairness. What should be addressed, though, are the technique and 
standard § 307 BGB uses for the substantive control of standard form 
contract terms. However, the importance of content control of standard 
form contract terms in German law should be emphasised, as it is the only 
option whereby the court can review the content of such terms.248  The 
position is somewhat different in South Africa.  
 
The South African law also reviews unfair contract terms and gives 
the judges the power to declare terms unenforceable if they are contrary to 
public policy.249  Additionally, and contrary to Germany, the second option 
by which the courts undertake a substantive control of unfair contract 
terms is confining such within reasonable bounds by interpreting them 
narrowly.250  In interpreting such unfair contract terms the court must first 
examine the nature of the contract in order to decide what legal positions 
concerning the questionable term would exist in the absence of the term 
(in the case of an exemption clause for example strict liability, negligence, 
gross negligence).251  As a second step the courts will then give the term 
the minimum of effectiveness by being interpreted narrowly as to place as 
light a burden as possible upon the submitting party.252  
 
Cases interpreting unfair contract terms narrowly are various. Essa 
v Divaris253  can be considered as one of the leading cases in this context. 
In this case, a lorry was stored in a garage at “owner’s risk”. A notice on 
the wall of the garage stated that all cars should be garaged at owner’s 
risk. The lorry was destroyed by fire. The “owner’s risk” term was in this 
case was interpreted as exempting the owner of the garage only from 
liability based on negligence as the minimum degree of blameworthiness. 
Also the judges in the decision Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Industrial 
                                                 
248 A detailed comparison of the technique taken by the both jurisdiction will follow under 
chapter 5 A III 4. 
249 For details see above chapter 4 A IV and the following comparison. 
250 Christie (note 57) at 214. 
251 Christie (note 57) at 215. 
252 Aronstam (note 12) at 34. 
253 1947 (1) SA 753 (A). 
 59 
 
Machinery Suppliers (Pty) Ltd254  interpreted a exemption clause couched 
in the widest possible term narrowly. It was held that there is no rule 
against interpreting an exemption clause as excluding liability for damages 
resulting from fundamental breach.255  Finally, in Van der Westhuizen v 
Arnold256  an exemption clause saving the user from any liability that might 
arise by operation of law or by virtue of representations or warranties was 
interpreted as protecting the user against liability for defects only.257
 
In Van der Westhuizen v Arnold258  it was also held that although 
the contra proferentem rule was in strict theory inapplicable because the 
words had a clear meaning, it nevertheless applied.259  This was justified 
by a need for interpreting terms that seek to limit oust common law rights 
where the exclusion is very general in its application and concerned the 
most fundamental obligation of one contractual party.260  It was also held 
that  
 
‘[i]n the absence of legislation regulating unfair contract terms, and where a provision 
does not offend public policy or considerations of good faith, a careful construction of 
the contract itself should ensure the protection of a party whose rights have been 
limited, but also give effect that to the principle that the other party should be able to 
protect himself or herself against liability insofar as it is legally permissible.’ 
 
The aforementioned statement shows that narrow interpretation in 
South African, e.g. applying the contra proferemtem rule, is used as the 
second means to review and restrict the content of unfair contract terms. 
Thus, interpreting contract terms is not only exercised for giving unclear 
words a precise meaning.       
 
 
                                                 
254 1993 (3) SA 424 (A). 
255 Elgin Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Machinery Suppliers (Pty) Ltd (note 254) at  
430-431.  
256 2002 (6) SA 453 (SCA). 
257 Van der Westhuizen v Arnold (note 256) at 468 A. 
258 (note 256). 
259 Van der Westhuizen v Arnold (note 256) at 464 D and 469 E. 
260 Van der Westhuizen v Arnold (note 256) at 464 D, 468 A and 469 E-G.  
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2.  The Function of the Contra Proferentem Rule 
It can be followed that the function of the contra proferentem rule, which is 
used in both jurisdictions, differs. As just illustrated, in South African law it 
is one of two means of reviewing the content of unfair contract terms. It is 
used as an option to restrict the scope of application of unfair contract 
terms and thus as a means of substantive control.  
 
Contrary to the South African law, German law regards the contra 
proferentem rule contained in § 305c(2) BGB exclusively as a standard of 
interpreting terms that are ambiguous. Also in German law it is possible to 
secretly review the content of standard form contract terms by means of 
the contra proferentem rule. However, the systematical location of the rule 
in § 305c(2) BGB, the intention of the legislator and the view of the BGH 
prohibit any substantive control under § 305c(2) BGB.261  § 305c(2) BGB 
must make it possible to determine whether a contract term valid or 
invalid.262  It is argued that, in contrast, South African courts do exactly 
that when they carefully construct unfair contract terms to ensure the 
protection of a party whose rights have been limited. Although nowhere 
openly admitted, the result of such a “careful” interpretation in South 
African law is finding the original term invalid and replacing it by a term 
that is legally permissible.  
 
A further difference concerning the contract proferentem rule is the 
circumstances taken into account in order to determine whether a contract 
term is ambiguous. In German law, the requirements in order to determine 
whether a term is ambiguous according to § 305c(2) BGB are 
controversial. This controversy involves using objective versus individual 
standards of construction to decide the issue of ambiguity.263  In this 
context, the BGH favours using objective criteria and therefore construes 
the terms without regard to individual circumstances.264  Factors to be 
taken into account are expectations, interests and the ability to understand 
                                                 
261 Jauernig (note 78) § 305c at 308 para 7;  
262 BGH 1979 Versicherungsrecht 370 at 371. 
263 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 352. 
264 See for example BGH 22 BGHZ at 90. 
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of an average contractual party.265  According to this universal and 
abstract approach, the contra proferentem rule of § 305c(2) BGB applies 
to consumer contracts and commercial contracts, as it is not excluded by § 
310(1) BGB.266  Nevertheless, according to § 305b BGB it applies to non-
negotiated contracts only (like the rest of the standard form contract law 
provisions as well). Contrary to this, in South African law individual 
circumstances are taken into account when determining if a clause has to 
be construed against its user.267  
 
 
3.  Importance of the Substantive Control of Standard Form Contract 
Terms by means of Good Faith / Public Policy 
The means of substantive control in German and South African differ. This 
is illustrative of the fact that German law places a higher regard to content 
control of standard form contract terms than South African law does. 
Content control forms the heart of the German law.268  The provisions §§ 
307 – 309 BGB aim to balance the submitting party’s lack of influence 
regarding the content of the standard form contract terms. Whereas the 
importance of the incorporation control of standard form contract terms 
has substantially declined.269       
 
This is contrary in South African law. There  
 
‘[t]he power of the courts to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, 
however, be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest cases, lest uncertainty to the 
validity of contracts result from an arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the power.’270  
 
The judges should be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to 
public policy because the contract terms offend one’s individual sense of 
                                                 
265 See for example BGH 33 BGHZ at 216. 
266 For details see above chapter 5 A I. 
267 See for example Cairns (Pty) Ltd v Playdon & Co Ltd (note 165) at 122-125; Durban’s  
Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha (note 160) at 989-990; Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 
(note 256) at 469 G. 
268 Jauernig (note 78) vor §§ 307 - 309 at 310 para 1. 
269 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 352. 
270 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 172) at 9 A. 
 62 
 
propriety and fairness.271  In South African law, it generally is recognised 
that judges have the responsibility to weigh up underlying values such as 
good faith and pacta sunt servanda when these come into conflict.272  
However, this power has to be exercised sparingly because the 
enforceability of contract terms would otherwise depend on what individual 
judges consider reasonable and fair in the circumstances.273  
 
 
4.  Standards of Substantive Control of Standard Form Contract 
Terms and Factors Taken into Account 
It can be noticed that German and South African law use different 
standards to determine the suitability of a term in a (standard form) 
contract. Whereas German law uses the notion of good faith for such 
determination (which underlies the content control contained in §§ 307 – 
309 BGB), South African law challenges contract terms against the notion 
of public policy. However, this section of the comparison will show that the 
standards of the substantive control of (standard form) contract terms do 
not differ much.    
 
In detail (and as briefly illustrated above), the German provision of § 
307 BGB provides the general standard by which the fairness of standard 
form contract terms is to be judged. Thus, a standard form contract term is 
invalid if it places the submitting partner at an unreasonable disadvantage 
and is therefore contrary to the notion of good faith. The provision of § 307 
BGB is thereby based on the general clause of good faith contained in § 
242 BGB.     
 
Under § 307 BGB, a standard form contract term does not comply 
with the notion of good faith if it is entirely one-sided and does not take 
into account the interests of the submitting party.274  It is required that 
obligations imposed by standard form contract terms are reasonable both 
                                                 
271 Ibid. 
272 Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) at 15 E-16 E. 
273 Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) at 16 B. 
274 Maxeiner (note 36) at 154. 
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in relation to the user’s interest and the burden imposed on the submitting 
party.275  In order to explore if the aforementioned requirements are 
fulfilled, German courts rely on fundamental principles of German law such 
as necessity (Erforderlichkeit) and proportionality 
(Verhältnismässigkeit).276  Thus, balancing out the different interests of the 
parties is required. 
 
Also South African courts balance out competing interests when 
they determine the suitability of a contract term. Contrary to German law, 
they use the instrument of public policy.277  
 
An agreement in South African law is defined as being contrary to 
public policy if  
 
Translation: ‘the upholding of the pertinent … contractual provision would, either 
because of extreme unfairness or because of other policy considerations, be in 
conflict with the interest of the community’.278
 
Due to the fact that public policy generally upholds the notion of 
freedom of contract, but that its conception is variable over space and 
time, the courts have to balance out competing considerations of a 
normative nature.279  Thus, they have to weigh the competing interest of 
the public in the enforcement of seriously intended agreements on the one 
side against ‘simple justice between man and man’.280    
 
It follows that the way of balancing out competing interests in South 
African law differs from the German law concerning the interest that are 
taken into account. While German law weighs the interests of the 
                                                 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 As illustrated earlier, this is only one option of substantive control of unfair contract 
terms in South Africa. The other option is applying the contra proferentem rule and 
interpreting the term narrowly.  
278 Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) at 34 I.   
279 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 172) at 8 I. 
280 Jaijbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 at 544. 
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contractual parties against one another, South Africa law weighs up full 
freedom of contract against restricting it in favour of individual justice.  
 
It is argued that this difference can be explained by the role of the 
BGB in German law. The presence of a comprehensive code in Germany 
furthers the recognition of the fact that the parties exercise their freedom 
of contract against the backdrop and within the framework of the law.281  
Therefore, contracts in German law are understood as an interaction 
between law and individual autonomy.282  Holistically, the BGB determines 
the extent of the permitted restrictions to the notion of freedom of contract. 
It weighs full freedom of contract against individual justice. Thus the notion 
of good faith as a provision of the BGB does not have to balance these 
competing interests again. On the other hand, South African law primarily 
seeks to enforce freely incurred contractual duties. However, if a situation 
occurs where the notion of freedom of contract is challenged, it is the role 
of public policy to determine whether such notion should be restricted at 
all. 
 
Due to the fact that common law aims to give full effect to the notion 
of freedom of contract, courts very seldom strike down a contract term 
because it is contrary to public policy. Nevertheless, it is argued that 
freedom of contract is limited by narrowly interpreting contract terms. This 
is achieved by means of the contra proferentem rule employed by the 
courts as the second option for a substantive control.283
 
Also the factors taken into account in determining if the challenged 
(standard form) contract term violates the notion of good faith in German 
law / is contrary to public policy in South African law are different. 
 
In German law, factors taken into account when balancing the 
interests of the contractual parties include ‘the nature and subject matter 
                                                 
281 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 344. 
282 Ibid. 
283 For details see above chapter 5 A III 2. 
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of the legal transaction, the requirements contracting parties must satisfy 
in terms of persons protected, and the economic reasons underlying the 
drafting of the standard form contract’.284  Where these factors provide no 
clear guidance, § 307(2) BGB instructs the courts to assume an 
unreasonable disadvantage under specific circumstances. The first 
presumption (§ 307(2) No 1 BGB) is the material departure from 
fundamental principles, which underlie the legal rules that would govern 
the contractual relationship without standard form contract terms. Such 
legal rules have the presumption of fairness in their favour.285  The second 
presumption (§ 307(2) No 2 BGB) concerns standard form contract terms 
that oppose the rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract.286  
This presumption for examples applies to situations where standard form 
contract terms eviscerate terms that are material to a contract.287    
 
In German law courts are thereby generally not supposed to 
concern themselves with the situation of the individual parties.288  Inquiries 
into the degree to which the submitting party for example lacked 
bargaining power must be disregarded.   
 
This is different in South African law. The position in South African 
law is that each agreement should be examined with regard to its own 
circumstances to ascertain whether the enforcement of the agreement 
would be contrary to public policy.289  In the case Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom inequality of bargaining power between the parties when the 
contract was concluded was one factor for which the contract term was 
challenged.290  However, the concrete and individual approach of the 
South Afrcan law is not as different from the abstract and universal 
                                                 
284 N Reich and H-W Micklitz Consumer Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Wiley, John & Sons, Inc: New York, Cincinatti, Toronto, London, Melbourne, 1981) at 
271.  
285 BGH 1965 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 246. 
286 See for example BGH 41 BGHZ 151. 
287 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 359.  
288 See for example Maxeiner (note 36) at 154. 
289 Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis (note 172) at 875; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v 
Beukes  (note 172) in general. 
290 (note 172) at 35 A. 
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approach of the German law as it seems to be. With the incorporation of 
the AGBG in the BGB, the wording of the provision § 310(3) BGB has 
been changed. According to § 310(3) No 3 BGB, in the case of a 
consumer contract the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the 
particular contract are also to be taken into account. Thus, in the case of a 
consumer contract the factors taken into account in both the German and 
South African law are the same. Thus the courts in both jurisdictions 
consider individual factors. 
 
A further difference between both jurisdictions can be pointed out 
by examining the technique used by German law in §§ 307 – 309 BGB. In 
§§ 308 and 309 BGB the German law provides guidelines for terms 
contrary to the notion of good faith. Such guidelines are drawn from 
previous case law and serve to create predictability and least 
uncertainty.291  Contrary to this feature in German law, South African law, 
as illustrated above, generally refuse to give guidelines as to what is 
conscionable in a contract or economically and socially desirable. This 
leads to a value-judgement in each particular case and creates flexibility.  
 
However, in German law the general provision of § 307 BGB serves 
to create flexibility. And least uncertainty in South African law is ensured 
by only sparingly exercising the power to declare unfair contract terms 
contrary to public policy.292  
 
 
5.  Limits and Extent of Substantial Control of Standard Form 
Contract Terms 
It can be noticed that the submitting party under German law enjoys a 
greater extent of protection than under South African law. As illustrated 
above, § 307(2) No 2 BGB presumes that standard form contract terms 
that oppose the rights and duties inherent in the nature of the contract 
                                                 
291 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 358. 
292 See for example Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes  (note 172) at 9 B. 
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violate the notion of good faith.293  Such a presumption applies to 
situations where standard form contract terms disembowel terms that are 
material to a contract.294  Thereby, the provision of § 307(2) No 2 BGB is 
complemented by § 307(2) No 1 BGB. A clear distinction between these 
two provisions is not easy to draw.295  As a result, in German law it is not 
possible to undermine the fundamental characteristics of a contract. For 
example a security clause in a sales contract providing that, as long as 
any item purchased from the store was not completely paid, all items 
bought from the store serve as security for the open balance and could be 
repossessed upon default of any payment would be held invalid under § 
307(2) No 2 BGB. Such extended possibility of repossession makes it 
difficult to obtain unrestricted possession of the purchased goods as right 
inherent to contract.  
 
Contrary to German law, in South African law it is generally 
possible to undermine the fundamental characteristics of a contract. Thus, 
it was held in the case Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom that a contract 
term contained in a hospital’s admission form, which exempted the 
hospital from liability for the negligence of its staff, was enforceable.296  
 
It is argued that this resulted in a modification of the consequences 
of the contract in a manner opposed to the nature of the contract itself. An 
exemption clause in the medical context effectively allows the hospital to 
provide a service, which is substantially different from the essential 
obligation normally imported by the contract.297  Typically, a contract to 
obtain medical care imports the provision of professionally acceptable 
medical care.298  The approach of the Court in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom ignored the foundations on which the medical professions are 
build – that of a caring relationship between healthcare worker and 
                                                 
293 See for example BGH 41 BGHZ at 151. 
294 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 359.  
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296 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) in general. 
297 T Naudé and G Lubbe ‘Exemption Clauses – A Rethink Occasioned by Afrox 
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patient.299  In a contract to obtain medical care the interest in the patient’s 
bodily inviolability is at stake.300  Such an interest is affected by an 
exemption clause that excludes the essence of the contract designed to 
protect it.301  
 
Generally, the decision of Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 
acknowledged that a court has the power to strike down contract terms 
contrary to public policy. However, the dicision can be considered as 
departure from the brief turn towards justice made by the case Sasfin (Pty) 
Ltd v Beukes302.  Whereas public policy was a useful tool in Sasfin (Pty) 
Ltd v Beukes303  which superseded the notion of freedom of contract, such 
notion was upheld above all other values in the decisions Brisley v 
Drotskey304  and Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom305.  In both the latter 
cases the courts returned to the traditional view that public policy favors 
the notion of freedom of contract.  
 
Despite the differing extent of protection of the submitting party in 
both jurisdictions, it can be noticed that both the German and South 
African law set limits for the substantial control of (standard form) contract 
terms. In South African law, this is achieved by the practise to declare 
contracts contrary to public policy sparingly and only in the clearest of 
cases.       
 
In German law, a limitation is achieved by means of § 307(3) BGB. 
Literally, the provision of § 307(3) BGB limits the content control of 
standard form contract terms that provide changes and additions to non-
compulsory provisions of the BGB. However, it is unanimously agreed that 
fundamental terms of the contract, namely performance and price, are 
                                                 
299 Naudé and Lubbe (note 297) at 460. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid. 
302 (note 172).  
303 Ibid. 
304 See Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) in general. 
305 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) in general. 
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also excluded from a content control.306  The exclusion of the essentialia 
negotii of a contract thereby serves to protect the notion of freedom of 
contract.307  The fundamental terms of the contract belong to the core of 
the notion of freedom of contract, which must not be restricted. Moreover, 
it is submitted that contractual parties do not need to be protected in 
respect of such terms. The underlying notion of the German standard form 
contract law is that the submitting party needs to be protected for certain 
reasons. One of these reasons is that such party is often unaware of the 
standard form contract terms or does not understand such. This is 
different concerning the performance and price of the contract. As 
fundamental terms, it can be presumes that both parties know about them 
and do want to include them into the contract. Therefore protection is not 
necessary.   
 
 
6.  Dogmatic Differences 
In order to determine the enforceability both jurisdictions use general 
principles for making / doing individual justice. However, it can be noticed 
that such general principles underlies a different dogmatic.     
 
A contract against public policy in South African law is defined as 
 
‘one stipulating performance which is not per se illegal or immoral but which the 
Courts, on grounds of expedience, will not enforce, because performance will 
detrimentally affect the interest of the community’.308    
 
It is argued that public policy is similar to the English doctrine of 
equity. The body of law referred to as equity in English law is supposed to 
be a supplement to the common law, in order to alleviate the rigidity and 
harshness of its rules.309  The aforementioned definition of public policy 
                                                 
306 See for example BGH 1998 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift at 383; Jauernig (note 78) 
§ 307 at 316 para 14. 
307 Jauernig (note 78) § 307 at 316 para 14. 
308 Aquilius ‘Immorality and Illegality in Contract’ 1941 SALJ 346. 
309 A Mason ‘The impact of equitable doctrine on the law of contract’ (1998) 26 Anglo-Am. 
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illustrates that also public policy serves as a supplementary control 
mechanism.     
 
Contrary to this role of public policy in South African law, good faith 
in German law is incorporated in the BGB (in § 242 BGB and § 307 BGB). 
Therefore it can be considered as a part of the BGB and not a 
supplement. 
 
 
IV.  Severability 
As illustrated above, in German law the remainder of a contract generally 
continues to be valid if some of its terms are found invalid, § 306(1) BGB. 
Standard form contract terms that have not become part of the contract or 
that are invalid are substituted by the relevant statutory rules of the BGB, § 
306(2) BGB.  
 
Contrary to the presumption of validity of the remainder of a 
contract in German law, the South African law on this matter has not been 
stated authoritatively.310  Even if an objectionable part of the contract can 
be severed according to the aforementioned test311  public policy may 
require that the contract should be enforced at all.312   However, there is 
also support for the view that severance from the illegal part will be 
allowed and the remainder of the contract will be upheld and enforced.313   
 
Noticeably different is that in South Africa the contract terms that 
have not become part of the contract or that are invalid are not substituted 
(e.g. by statutory rules as there are no statutory rules in this area of law). 
This difference interacts with the different means for substantive control of 
(standard form) contract terms in both jurisdictions. As illustrated above, a 
content control in German law is only possible by means of §§ 307 – 309 
BGB. In South African law substantive control is possible by using public 
                                                 
310 Van der Merwe, Van Huysteen, Reinecke, and Lubbe (note 1) at 186. 
311 For details see chapter 4 A VI. 
312 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes (note 172) at 15 et seq. 
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policy and by using the contra proferentem rule. The latter possibility may 
sound dogmatically unsound, as the contra proferentem rule is a rule for 
interpreting ambiguous contract terms.  
 
However, it is argued that the use of the contra proferentem rule in 
South African law is understandable and makes sense in the particular 
circumstances. South African law does not provide for statutory rules of 
law that can substitute contract terms that are held unenforceable. 
Additionally, a general rule is that the court may not make a contract for 
the parties.314  Therefore the question arises what happens to the “gap” in 
the contract that arises due to the enforceability of a particular contract 
term. Besides providing the guidelines that I illustrated earlier in this 
section, South African courts avoid giving an answer to this question by 
using the contra proferentem rule as illustrated above. It is argued that by 
narrowly interpreting a contract term nothing else is done but substituting 
such unfair term by giving it its minimum of effectiveness. The end result 
then is the same as in German law where invalid unfair standard form 
contract terms are substituted by statutory provisions.           
 
 
V.  Institutional Action versus Individual Litigation  
Finally, one main difference between the German and the South African 
law on standard form contracts lies in the procedural provisions. As 
illustrated above, German law provides in its Unterlassungsklagengesetz 
(Law of Actions for Injunctions for Violations of Consumer and Other Law, 
UklaG) specific provisions for measures designed to prevent the use of 
unfair standard terms. Thus, German law operates with the so-called 
institutional action (Verbandsklage).315  As described above, this 
institutional action can be stated more succinctly as follows: A consumer 
organisation brings an action against the user of unfair contract terms (§ 
1UklaG). If these terms are found to be invalid in the judgment, they are 
invalid in respect of all standard form contracts containing this invalid 
                                                 
314 Laws v Rutherfurd (note 183) at 264. 
315 For details see above chapter 3 A II. 
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terms (§ 11 UklaG). This consumer organisation also exercises a 
monitoring function. Thus the user of the unfair contract term is subject to 
a fine if that user continues to use the term, which was previously declared 
invalid. This institutional action must not be confused with class actions. 
The institutional action operates as an independent watchdog. 
Additionally, consumers still have the opportunity to bring an ordinary 
action against the user of illegal standard form contract terms. In contrast, 
this institutional action does not exist under South African law.316  
 
 
                                                 
316 Advantages and disadvantage of this situation will be discussed in the evaluation 
contained in chapter 6 E.  
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B.  Comparison in a Broader Context: Further Thoughts 
The German and South African law on standard form contracts reflect the 
difference in approach taken by those jurisdictions when the tension 
between freedom of contract and individual justice is balanced. The 
jurisdictional approaches demonstrate that although different, they come 
to the same or to a similar result. However, it can also be noticed that the 
German law of contract in general is illustrative of a tendency towards 
individual justice, whereas the South African law of contract leans towards 
upholding the notion of freedom of contract. German and South African 
law on standard form contracts also serve to illustrate the influence of the 
Bill of Rights in German and South African contract law. 
 
 
I.  Classification of Standard Form Contract Terms  
Generally, it can be noticed that German law seems to be one step ahead 
of South Africa in dealing with standard form contracts. German law 
provides special provisions that deal with standard form contracts. Thus, 
German law has recognised that standard form contract terms are 
different from “classical” contract terms. The German approach is 
cognisant of the problems that occur when parties enter into a standard 
form contract.317  The provisions of the BGB on standard form contracts 
reflect this awareness.  
 
Although German standard form contract terms are unanimously 
considered as a special species of contractual terms, some commentators 
have even proposed that such terms have the quality of regulatory 
(administrative) law.318  This view can be rejected because the law on 
standard form contracts treats such terms as contractual provisions and 
not regulatory provisions.319  The drafter or user of standard form contract 
terms has no authority to impose regulatory law on the other party.320  
Such power would be necessary in order to qualify standard form contract 
                                                 
317 Such problems are outlined in chapter two. 
318 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 344. 
319 See for example RG 179 RGZ at 223; BGH 83 BGHZ at 86.  
320 Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 344. 
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terms as regulatory law. Standard form contract terms rather become a 
part of the contract by agreement of both parties.  
 
However, the idea that standard form contract terms can be 
characterised as regulatory law is not without reason.321  Such a 
characterisation furthers an understanding that such terms are different 
from individually negotiated terms.322  It also illustrates that the consent of 
the party subject to standard form contract terms is defective.323  The 
characterisation of standard form contract terms as regulatory terms 
illustrates that the consent to such terms is defective because of two 
reasons: Firstly, it is not based on a true choice of the party subject to the 
terms and secondly, such party usually does not even know or understand 
what he or she has assented to.324  However, the recognition by German 
law that such terms are distinct from classical contract terms is 
important.325   
 
Such recognition helped the German law on standard form 
contracts to make a basic distinction between standard from contract 
terms and individually negotiated ones.326  It is argued that such distinction 
is one of the most important achievements of modern contract law. 
German standard form contract law can be considered a success in this 
regard.327                    
 
Contrary to German law, the current South African law does not 
differentiate between standard form contract terms and individually 
negotiated ones. Thus, special provisions cannot be found. However, 
South African contract law also recognises the need for special treatment 
of unfair (standard form) contract terms. In order to satisfy this need, 
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South African law has established certain exceptional rules to the classical 
rules of its contract law. In this spirit, exceptions to the caveat subscriptor 
rule and to an absolute upholding of the notion of freedom of contract can 
be found.328  Such rules and their exceptions form current South African 
law dealing with standard form contracts. It is submitted that such system 
is confusing for a neutral observer and not systematically sound.  
 
However, Germany’s law on standard form contracts also started 
off as judge-made law that established exceptions to rules and principles 
of classic German contract law. Moreover, the South African legislator has 
drafted a proposed Act on unfair contract terms. Thus, the need for 
changes and clearance in this area of law has been recognised. Pending 
these changes, South African contract law remains highly controversial in 
this regard. 
 
 
II.  Ways of Balancing out the Competing Interests of the Notion of 
Freedom of Contract and Consumer Protection  
Both jurisdictions recognise that the control of standard form contract 
terms challenges the notion of freedom of contract. German consumer 
protection legislation that deals with standard form contracts has taken the 
notion of freedom of contract into account. South African courts also took 
this notion into account in regard to common law rules that apply to 
standard form contracts. Therefore both the German and South African 
law aim to control standard form contract terms without aborting the notion 
of freedom of contract. In this context, it can be noticed, that both 
jurisdictions balance the competing interests of freedom of contract and 
consumer protection by using different means.  
 
German law uses a so-called contract model.329  In German theory, 
the contract model does not limit the notion of freedom of contract.330  In 
                                                 
328 For details see above chapter 5 A III. 
329 Maxeiner (note 36) at 146. 
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prohibiting the user of standard form contract terms from taking 
inappropriate advantage of the party subject to such terms, German law 
claims that it does not limit the core of the notion of freedom of contract. It 
considers the freedom to enter into a contract (Abschlussfreiheit) as such 
core.331  Standard form contract law, in preventing the use of certain 
standard form contract terms, limits only the freedom to shape the 
conditions of a contract (Gestaltungsfreiheit). Therefore German law 
argues that the core of the notion of freedom of contract is untouched.332
 
The German contract model has its name because it applies to all 
standard form contracts without limitation as to personal characteristics of 
the contractual parties.333  The content control it imposes is considered to 
be abstract and universal. Thereby the contract model does not ask 
whether the standard form contract term is fair in regard to the particular 
parties of the contract. As illustrated earlier, the circumstances of the 
individual parties to the particular contract are not taken into account. Thus 
it is not necessary for courts to find that the party subject to standard form 
contract terms is a weak party in order for the contractual terms to be 
declared invalid. German standard form contract law applies to both 
consumer contracts and commercial contracts. The only concession 
German law makes is to take into account specific experience and 
capability of a party subject to standard form contract terms when deciding 
on the ambiguity of a term under § 305c(2) BGB. The focus of review of 
German standard from contract terms is thereby the control of their 
content.334       
 
Contrary to German law, South African law uses the so-called 
consumer model. As opposed to the contract model, the South African 
                                                                                                                                     
330 See BT (Bundestag)-Drucksache (Report of the German Law Commission) 14/6040 at 
149. 
331 As illustrated above, also shaping the fundamental terms of the contract belongs to the 
core of the German notion of freedom of contract. 
332 Maxeiner (note 36) at 148. 
333 Maxeiner (note 36) at 160. 
334 Maxeiner (note 36) at 146; Holmes and Thurmann (note 46) at 352. 
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consumer model is limited to consumer contracts.335  This does not mean 
that the common law rules developed to protect the party subject to the 
standard form contract terms are only applicable to consumer contracts. 
Such rules apply, like in Germany, to commercial contracts and consumer 
contracts. However, due to the fact that South African law takes individual 
circumstances into account when reviewing the content of standard form 
contract terms, the protecting rules apply hardly to commercial contracts. 
A finding of weakness in the party subject to standard form contract terms 
is not likely if contracting business people are concerned. The typical lack 
of bargaining power will rather be found if a consumer is involved.    
 
Using the consumer model, South African law balances out the 
competing interests between the notion of freedom of contract and 
consumer protection different from German law. While generally favouring 
the consumer, South African law focuses its review of (standard form) 
contract terms on incorporation and interpretation of such terms. As 
illustrated above, the power to declare a contract term unenforceable 
because its content is contrary to public policy and thus limiting the parties’ 
freedom of contracts is exercised very sparingly and only in the clearest 
cases.  
 
   
III.  The Role of Good Faith in German and South African Contract 
Law  
The approaches of German and South African law on standard form 
contracts are good examples of the role of good faith in both jurisdictions’ 
contract law. The role of good faith differs considerably in both 
jurisdictions. Whereas under German law, the notion of good faith 
declares contract terms that violate such notion invalid (§ 242 BGB), South 
African law only acknowledges good faith as underlying principle of the 
contract law.336  However, the notion of good faith in both jurisdictions, 
despite the differences, is regarded as an ethical value or controlling 
                                                 
335 See Maxheimer (note 38) at 160 who considers US-American contracts. 
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principle, which is based on community services and standards of 
fairness, that underlies and informs the law of contract.337  In both German 
and South African law, the notion of good faith, finds expression in various 
legal rules and doctrines, Furthermore, the notion of good faith defines the 
form, content and field of application of these legal rules and doctrines.338  
 
As mentioned above, the general clause of the content control of 
standard term contract terms in Germany, § 307 BGB, copies the general 
clause of the BGB concerning good faith: § 242 BGB. Thus, § 307 BGB 
expresses the relevance of the notion of good faith in the German 
standard form contract law. 
  
Generally, the notion of good faith plays a huge role in German 
contract law. It can be noticed that the wording of § 242 BGB339  is a 
general and bland statement. However, it is precisely this generality that 
makes the provision so important.340  Thus, § 242 BGB functions as a 
means of German private law to keep the BGB up to date.341  Its 
generality allowed it to become the hook on which numerous value 
judgments of German courts could be attached.342  For example and as 
illustrated above, the content control of standard form contract terms 
originates from § 242 BGB.   
 
Briefly, § 242 BGB has three functions in German law. Firstly, the 
provision of good faith has the function to flesh out the contractual 
relationship of the parties where provisions in the BGB are missing 
(Ergänzungsfunktion).343  Secondly, it has the function of re-construction 
                                                 
337 For South Africa: D Hutchinson ‘Good Faith in the South African Law of Contract’ in R  
Browndword, NJ Hird and G Howells (eds) Good faith in Contract, Concept and Context 
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of contractual obligations (Korrekturfunktion).344  Thirdly, and particularly 
relevant for standard form contracts, the notion of good faith has the 
function to limit the power of all rights bearers to exercise such rights.345  
In the context of the last function, the rights bearer must not take unfair 
advantage of another rights bearer, probably his or her contractual 
partner.  
 
The importance of these functions is highlighted by the 
consequences for violating the notion of good faith. In the case of a 
contract term violating the notion of good faith, such term is invalid and 
thus unenforceable.346
 
The role of good faith in South African law is contrary to the strong 
notions of good faith in German law. In many regards, good faith is a 
nebulous and ill-conceived aspect of South African contract law.347  For a 
long time, a remarkable aspect of the South African contract law was the 
complete absence of the notion of good faith.348  Nowadays, the notion of 
good faith exists in South African contract law, and its role is clearly 
defined. The next chapter will be concerned with assessing whether the 
current role and definition are sufficient and whether such role and 
definition should be supported,  
 
After its absence in the South African contract law, the elimination 
of the exceptio doli set the scene for a dramatic entrance of the notion of 
good faith.349  Thus, in the case of Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike 
Africa Bpk v Saayman NO350  it was held that if good faith so required, a 
court could refuse to enforce an otherwise valid contract. Although this 
decision was welcomed, such brief turn towards fairness in the South 
                                                 
344 Markesinis, Lorenz and Dannemann (note 66) at 514. 
345 Jauernig (note 78) § 242 at 167 para 7. 
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African law of contract was effectively ended in Brisley v Drotsky.351  The 
Court in Brisley clearly defined the role of the notion of good faith. The 
Court practically dismissed such notion and held, that it operates 
indirectly, i.e. not as 
 
Translation: ‘an independent, or “free-floating” basis for the setting aside or non-
enforcement of contractual provisions… Good faith is a foundational principle that 
underlies contract law and finds expression in the specific rules and principles of the 
latter’.352
 
This departure from fairness in South African contract law was 
approved in the case Afrox353  and more recently in South African Forestry 
Co Ltd v York Timbers354.  Due to such recent case law, a refusal of a 
direct use of the notion of freedom of contract can be noticed. 
 
The notion of good faith in South African law is regarded as  
 
‘an ethical value or controlling principle, based on community standards of decency 
and fairness, that underlies and informs the substantive law of contract. It finds 
expression in various technical rules and doctrines, defines their form, content and 
field of application and provides them with a moral and theoretical foundation’.355
 
Thus, it can be noticed that courts In South Africa law, contrary to German 
law, do not have power to declare contract terms invalid because they 
violate the notion of good faith. The South African notion of good faith is 
not an uncodified version to § 242 BGB.356  However, in both jurisdictions 
the notion of good faith, although not regarded as legal rule in South 
African law, reflect a basis of the doctrinal substance of the law and 
influences its formation and adaptation.357  In German law, one example 
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for such formation and adaptation of the law is the development of the law 
on standard form contracts.  
 
In South African law, the notion of good faith is an aspect of the 
wider notion of public policy: the courts invoke and apply such notion 
whenever the public interest so demands.358  That leads to the question of 
whether public policy in South African law has become the equivalent to 
the notion of good faith in German law? The use of the notion of good faith 
in German law to strike down unfair standard form contract terms and the 
use of the notion of public policy in South African law to do so could lead 
to such an assumption.   
 
However, it is argued that the notion of public policy in South 
African law, although having reached similar results in some cases, cannot 
be considered to be the equivalent of the notion of good faith in German 
law. Whereas the notion of good faith in German contract law reviews the 
behaviour of the parties in respect of contractual fairness, public policy in 
South African law balances out the notion of freedom of contract on the 
one hand with the need for individual justice on the other hand.359  Public 
policy can be seen as the mantle under which such competing factors 
operate.360   
 
The notion of good faith in German law provides the courts with the 
power to grant individual justice and therefore establishes a certain degree 
of fairness in the German civil law. As illustrated above, public policy 
generally favours the notion of freedom of contract and declares unfair 
contract terms contrary to good faith very sparingly and only in the clearest 
of cases. Thus, it is submitted that individual justice and fairness have a 
greater significance in German contract law than they do in South African 
contract law.          
 
                                                 
358 Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Africa Bpk v Saayman NO (note 393) at 406 h-i. 
359 For details see above chapter 5 A III 3 and 4. 
360 Fletcher (note 347) at 6. 
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IV.  The Influence of the Bill of Rights in German and South African 
Contract Law 
The approaches of German and South African law on standard form 
contracts also illustrate the influence of the Bill of Rights in German and 
South African contract law. In both jurisdictions, the Bill of Rights operates 
horizontally.  
 
German law, in this respect, shows a very sophisticated a rational 
approach of how to balance the basic right of individual autonomy from 
state intervention against the right of other individuals.361  Although the 
German Constitution (GG) does not discuss the horizontal effect of human 
rights, such an effect is acknowledged in modern German law. 
 
Thereby, German law opened up the possibility to subject private 
law to the regime of the Constitution rather early in its history.362  In the so-
called Lüth decision the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, hereinafter BVerfG) ‘held that the Bill of 
Rights not only provides the individual citizen with protection against the 
state, but also constitutes a system of basic values permeating the legal 
system as a whole’ (horizontal effect of human rights).363  Since then, the 
German Bill of Rights is considered to constitute a comprehensive value 
system.364  Thereby, the entire body of private law has to be interpreted in 
the spirit of the Bill of Rights (so-called concept of indirect effect of the Bill 
of Rights).365  Major ports of entry for the constitutional value system are 
the general clauses contained in the BGB, especially §§ 138 (good 
morals) and 242 (good faith) BGB.366     
 
                                                 
361 B Markesinis ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Horizontal Effect of the Human 
Rights Bill: Lessons From Germany’ (1999) 115 The Law Quarterly Review 47 at 47-48. 
362 Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 274. 
363 7 BVerfGE at 198; and Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 274. 
364 In this context see the Elfes decision of the BVerfG 6 BVerfGE at 32. 
365 Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 275. 
366 Ibid. 
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Accordingly, the BGH soon started to distance itself from purely 
formalistic approaches, which upheld the notion of freedom of contract.367  
The Bill of Rights in the law of contract applied horizontally by using §§ 
138 and 242 BGB as means for policing the substantive fairness of 
standard form contracts.368         
 
The underlying basis of this policing is the guarantee of the 
autonomy of private individuals (Art 2(1) GG). Such autonomy is not 
properly safeguarded by a regime of an unrestricted notion of freedom of 
contract.369  The BverfG deems that parties who are engaged in private 
transactions are fundamentally equal in regards to their protection by the 
Bill of Rights.370  It has been held that, this fundamental equality would be 
disregarded only if the rights of the more powerful party were to prevail.371  
Where one party dominated to such extent that it alone could determine 
the content of the contract, the behaviour of the other party is 
characterised by heteronomy rather than by self-determination.372  Thus, 
in typical situations such as the situation where one party is inferior and 
the other superior373  the legal system has to provide a rescue in order to 
maintain private autonomy and to comply with the requirements of the 
Sozialstaat374  principle.375  As a result one can say that the German law 
on standard form contracts is a product of the influence of the Bill of Rights 
in German contract law. 
 
Contrary to the German Constitution, the South African Constitution 
has expressly stated the horizontal application of the Bill of Rights in its 
section 8. Thereby, section 8 lays down a two-stages process of the 
horizontal application. Firstly, section 8(2) requires an examination of the 
                                                 
367 Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 279. 
368 For details see above chapter 3 B. 
369 Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 277. 
370 See for example 89 BVerfGE at 214. 
371 Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 277. 
372 Ibid. 
373 An example for a contract in such a situation is, as illustrated in chapter 2, a standard 
form contract. 
374 Literally translated: principle of social welfare state. 
375 Habersack and Zimmermann (note 24) at 275. 
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right in question and its correlative duty in order to see if they are 
applicable.376  Secondly, if such right and duty are applicable, section 
8(3)(a) requires the court to give effect to them by applying or developing 
the common law “to the extent of that right.” 
 
Section 8 of the South African Constitution becomes relevant in 
relation to the law of contract if a term contained within a contract is 
suspected of violating a constitutional right. When deciding, in accordance 
with section 8, whether and to what extent a constitutional right is 
applicable and whether the right should be limited, the principle pacta sunt 
servanda must always be taken into account.377  In other words, the 
horizontal effect of human rights in South African contract law requires 
weighing the right to enforcement of a contract (together with its corollary 
the notion of freedom of contract) against a constitutional right.378  In the 
case of standard form contracts, such constitutional right could be section 
9: equality in the sense of contractual equality. Similar to German law, the 
right to contractual equality would be disregarded if the right of the more 
powerful party (i.e. freedom of contract) would succeed. It is argued that 
freedom of contract, when abused by the party with the greater bargaining 
power to achieve unfair contracts, undermines the values of equality and 
dignity that are supposed to permeate the South African constitutional 
dispensation.379  
 
Taking the aforementioned basis into consideration, the judges in 
the South African case of Brisley v Drotsky stated that public policy in its 
modern guise is rooted in the Constitution and the fundamental values it 
enshrines.380  Accepting this dictum, it was expressly held in Afrox that the 
higher courts are obliged to develop the common law in order to give 
                                                 
376 RH Christie ‘The law of contract and the Bill of Rights’ Bill of Rights Compedium  
(looseleaf 1998- ) para 3H1 at para 3H3.    
377 Christie (note 376) at para 3H5. 
378 Ibid. 
379 D Tladi ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back for Constitutionalising the Common Law: 
Afrox Health Care v Strydom’ (2002) 17 SA Public Law 473 at 477.  
380 Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) at 34 G-H. 
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effect to the Bill of Rights.381  Accordingly, there is a further similarity to 
German law, as public policy as a general rule can serve as a vehicle for 
the realisation of human rights.         
 
As a result, one might think that human rights play the same role in 
German and South African law of contract. However, this is not the case. 
Although both jurisdictions have the same starting point concerning a 
horizontal effect of human rights, as well as general rules that serve as 
ports of entry, it is argued that only German law consequently applies 
human rights when reviewing unfair contracts. In South Africa, the 
recognition of the courts to take human rights into consideration when 
reviewing a contract did not yield any practical results yet.382  In both 
cases, Brisley v Drotsky and Afrox, the questionable contract terms were 
held enforceable.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
381Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) at 37 D-E.  
382 Lubbe (note 356) at 410. 
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Chapter Six  
Should South Africa Adopt Legislation on Standard Form Contracts?  
 
In light of the questions raised within the first 5 chapters of this 
dissertation, this final chapter aims to discuss whether South Africa should 
introduce legislation on standard from contracts. However this chapter will 
preclude a detailed discussion of the form this legislation should exhibit. In 
this regard, the German law on standard form contracts will provide an 
example of a jurisdiction where such legislation has been introduced and 
whether such legislation has been successful. 
 
Introducing legislation governing standard form contracts in South 
Africa will require the common law to be developed. This development is 
necessary in order to give effect to the Bill of Rights and allow the notion 
of good faith to play a more significant role. Thus, the discussion will also 
contain arguments on these issues.   
 
 
A.  Should the Notion of Good Faith Have a More Significant Role in 
South African Contract Law?  
As illustrated above, good faith operates indirectly in South African law. It 
is only one factor that is taken into account when deciding whether a 
contract term is contrary to public policy. As illustrated above, South 
African public policy generally favours the competing notion of freedom of 
contract. Accordingly, it should be determined whether the notion of good 
faith should have a more significant role in South African contract law than 
its present status allows? It is argued that the answer to the afore-stated 
question is that good faith should play a more significant role. 
  
In finding an answer, one must determine the needs of South 
African society. One must also consider that the economic climate in 
South Africa is dynamic. Thus this dynamism must be translated into 
South African contract law in order for the law to remain a useful 
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institution.383  South Africa has reached the stage of economic 
development described above, where individuals have no choice but to 
contract with vast and powerful corporations on an almost daily basis.384  
The power disparity inherent in such a bargaining situation needs no 
further explanation. Accordingly, there is a need for a more significant role 
of the notion of good faith. This need exists in order to protect the weaker 
party in the bargaining process. 
 
Another issue in favour of a stronger notion of good faith concerns 
the linguistic diversity of South Africa. Many people do not understand 
English or Afrikaans as the two major languages of South Africa’s 
economy. Thus, they are predisposed to being victims of unfair contract 
terms via the widespread use of standard form contracts.385   
 
This language disadvantage adds to the problems experienced by 
people subject to standard form contract terms. Typically the subjecting 
party does not read or understand the content of such term due to the 
complicated language in which such term is written. Furthermore, the spirit 
of the South African Bill of Rights leans towards a stronger notion of good 
faith in contracting.  
 
 
B.  Should South African Courts Develop the Common Law in order 
to Protect the Weaker Party of a Contract to a Greater Extent?     
Presently, although all law inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid, and 
although courts should promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights, South African courts upheld the notion of freedom of contract 
above all other values.386  This is possible as a result of the fact that the 
Constitution contains a variety of human rights that in certain cases 
conflict.387  In the law of contract such rights include human dignity and 
                                                 
383 Fletcher (note 347) at 8. 
384 Fletcher (note 347) at 9. 
385 Fletcher (note 347) at 10. 
386 Tladi (note 379) at 477; Hawthorne (note 348) at 294. 
387 Hawthorne (note 348) at 294. 
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equality on the one hand and the notion of freedom of contract in the other 
hand. In the case of Afrox, where the notion of freedom of contract was 
upheld, it was stated that freedom of contract promotes constitutional 
values.388
 
It is argued that such view does not sufficiently address the 
inequality of bargaining power. Thus, the notion of freedom of contract is 
based on the false assumption that all contracting parties are equal.389  
Certainly, in cases where the contracting parties are equal concerning 
their bargaining power, the notion of freedom of contract is 
unobjectionable.390  However, if they are not, upholding such notion can 
result in ‘obscene excesses’, which are unfair to the party with less 
bargaining power.391  Therefore, the abuse of freedom of contract by the 
stronger party undermines the values of equality and dignity of the weaker 
party with less bargaining power.392  
 
In order to exist, the notion of freedom of contract presupposes 
equality between the contracting parties.393  If such equality does not exist, 
the task of the Constitution should be to protect the weak and exploited 
party. As argued above, although the need has been recognised, such 
protection has not been developed sufficiently at present. Therefore, the 
common law must be developed in favour of the weaker party. And the 
weaker party in the case of standard form contracts is the party who is 
subject to the terms of such contracts.  
 
 
C.  Should South Africa Introduce Legislation Even if the Answer to 
the Above Questions is Affirmative?  
If the aforementioned questions are answered affirmatively, and the notion 
of good faith is allowed to play a more significant role as well as 
                                                 
388 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom (note 172) in general. 
389 Tladi (note 379) at 477. 
390 Ibid. 
391 Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) at 35D. 
392 Tladi (note 379) at 477. 
393 Hawthorne (note 348) at 301. 
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developing the common law in favour of the weaker contractual party, this 
would give the courts a greater power to declare unfair (standard form) 
contract terms contrary to public policy (or even good faith). One must be 
aware that the problems which occur in cases of standard form contracts 
will not be solved. It is argued that such a solution is not sufficient and that 
the need for legislation is evident.   
 
As was expressly held in separate concurring judgment of Cameron 
J, in Brisley v Drotsky   
 
`neither the Constitution nor the value system it embodies gives the courts a general 
jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the basis of judicially perceived notions of 
unjustness or to determine their enforceability on the basis of imprecise notions of 
good faith.´394   
 
The aforementioned dicta illustrates that South African courts 
perceive judicial supervision of contracts to be contrary to the fundamental 
principle of freedom of contract.395  The Constitution might bestow courts 
with a greater power to declare contractual terms contrary to public policy, 
but this does not permit the courts to ignore precedents.396  
  
Accordingly, in order to provide for a proper protection of the party 
subject to unfair (standard form) contract terms, a statutory framework in 
which courts are given the power to scrutinise the fairness of contractual 
terms is necessary.397   
 
An argument against the introduction of legislation is that such 
legislation would denigrate two fundamental principles in contract law: 
certainty and the notion of freedom of contract.398  Certainty in contract 
law allows contractual parties to plan their future safely.399  It is also 
                                                 
394 Brisley v Drotsky (note 172) at 35C-E. 
395 J Lewis `Fairness in South African Contract Law´ (2003) 120 SALJ 330 at 330. 
396 Lewis (note 395) at 338. 
397 Lewis (note 395) at 330. 
398 Fletcher (note 347) at 10; Lewis (note 395) at 344. 
399 Lewis (note 395) at 344. 
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important for South Africa’s economy as it attracts investors. It cannot be 
denied that such certainty in law is very important.400  Giving good faith in 
contract law a more significant role might detract from legal certainty. 
However, it is submitted that such concerns are misplaced. Legislation 
governing standard form contracts could provide detailed guidelines as to 
what is considered fair. Such guidelines are provided by the German law 
in relation to §§ 308 and 309 BGB and by section 2 of the proposal of the 
South African Law Commission. Furthermore, the use of such guidelines 
serves to enhance legal certainty regarding standard form contracts.401  
The adherence to these guidelines would allow contractual parties to tailor 
their actions accordingly. Furthermore, statutory guidelines also exhibit a 
preventative effect. If users of standard form contracts terms are aware in 
advance of the permissible and enforceable limits, it is argued that the use 
of unfair contract terms would be prevented.     
 
Another fear is that legislation would lead to a flood of litigation and 
that courts would be burdened with hundreds of cases.402  Businesses 
would be disinclined to contract with consumers who might make use of 
the legislation to escape the contract.403  It is submitted that such 
arguments are convincing in deterring the implementation of legislation. 
Individuals must not be denied contractual justice and fairness due to the 
fear that such legislation would result in extra work for the courts.404    
 
Much has been canvassed earlier in this chapter concerning the 
fears that legislation would degrade the notion of freedom of contract. 
Thus, restricting the notion of freedom of contract to promote contractual 
fairness is not only just justifiable, but also advisable. However, the view 
taken by South African judges, that the notion of freedom of contract has 
                                                 
400 Fletcher (note 347) at 11. 
401 Lewis (note 395) at 346. 
402 Lewis (note 395) at 344. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Lewis (note 395) at 345. 
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to be upheld above other values, seems out of sorts in a developing 
country, in which illiteracy, poverty, disease are widespread.405  
 
It is suggested that the notion of freedom of contract must rather be 
placed in the context of society, its values and the economy406,  instead of 
judges slavishly adhering to this notion. German law on standard form 
contract shows407  that fairness in the law of contract and the parties’ 
freedom of contract are not mutually exclusive.    
 
 
D.  Should the Legislation Apply to Contractual Terms in General or 
to Standard Form Contract Terms Only? 
Taking all these thought into consideration, one has to determine whether 
the necessary legislation should be applicable to contractual terms in 
general or to standard form contract terms only. It is argued that only in 
cases where the contract is contained in a standard form is there sufficient 
reason to limit the notion of freedom of contract.408  There is no convincing 
reason to interfere with the notion of freedom of contract if the questioned 
term is the result of a give-and-take process of bargaining.409  Only where 
the party subject to the contract terms accepts such without having a 
chance to bargain, the argument that the notion of freedom of contract 
may not have worked properly applies.410  Therefore, legislation should be 
introduced only in respect of standard form contract terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
405 Hawthorne (note 348) at 301. 
406 Hawthorne (note 348) at 295. 
407 The German law on standard form contract uses its contract model, which aims to 
leave the core of freedom of contract intact. 
408 Lubbe (note 356) at 409. 
409 Lubbe (note 356) at 410 
410 Ibid. 
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E.  Which Mechanism Should be Introduced in order to Make the 
Legislation Effective? 
Introducing legislation on standard form contract terms in South Africa is 
necessary. However, equally important is to provide for a mechanism 
through which the legislation is to be made effective. 
 
The mechanism normally available is private litigation. Thereby, the 
party subject to standard form contract terms bases the claim or defence 
on the invalidity of the term on which the user of such term relies.411  It is 
argued that such mechanism is not a satisfactory solution to the problems, 
which occur in standard form contract cases.  
 
A litigation-based remedy places the entire burden of redress on 
the party subject to the standard form contract terms. This has the 
disadvantage that the costs of litigation preclude many of such parties 
from bringing the matter to court to obtain redress.412  Thus, protection of 
the party subject to the standard form contract exists in theory only, if such 
party has to resort the court by him- or herself.413
 
More effective in this context is a mechanism that provides for a 
kind of administrative regulation. A watchdog, which brings questionable 
contract terms to court in order for review, is necessary. A good example 
of such a mechanism is the institutional action of the German law on 
standard form contracts as outlined above. Such or similar mechanisms 
allow courts to hold standard form contract terms invalid and 
unenforceable in respect of every person that ever concluded the same 
standard form contract. Control by administrative regulation or institutional 
action provides preventive protection that litigation-based mechanisms are 
not able to provide.414  
 
                                                 
411 Lubbe (note 356) at 415. 
412 Bates (note 44) at 6. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Bates (note 44) at 9. 
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Thus, South African legislation on standard form contracts must 
include a mechanism through which such legislation is to be made 
effective. One example in this regard is the Ombudsperson, which the 
South African Law Commission proposes (section 6 of the proposed 
“Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in 
Contracts or Terms Act”). 
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Conclusion 
 
Holistically, the German and South African laws on standard form contract 
terms differ substantially. Both jurisdictions have opted to employ 
seemingly different systems to deal with the same problems. However, it 
can be noted that although the approaches differ, the results are similar. 
Nevertheless, the German law grants greater protection to the submitting 
party. South African law possesses the means to afford greater protection 
to such party, as it is acknowledged that contract terms contrary to public 
policy are unenforceable and that the Bill of Rights influences contract law. 
However, South African courts are still conservative in their approach and 
favour the notion of freedom of contract. 
 
In comparing the German and the South African legal systems on 
standard form contract law it is argued that South Africa should follow a 
similar system to the German one. German law offers a wide range of 
protection to the party subject to the standard form contract terms. Such 
protection occurs predominantly through legislation, whereas South 
African law relies heavily on the general rules and principles contained 
within the common law. A strong case can be made for South Africa 
adopting legislation. At present, the values contained within the 
Constitution, are not given proper effect to. As a constitutional state and a 
developing nation, it makes sense to codify constitutional values, so that 
each person has access to the law. The common law system is at times 
unclear, compromising and whimsical. More guidance needs to be given 
to judges, so that the established competing interests may be balanced 
fairly. As canvassed above, the German law began much like the South 
African system, but has evolved into something more coherent. 
 
South African courts have taken a conservative view in 
administering justice in cases of unfair contract terms. By in large, the 
courts have favoured the notion of freedom of contract ahead of individual 
justice. Courts in South Africa are restrained in that the vast majority of 
precedents favour the notion of freedom of contract. In order to break free 
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from this restraint, guidance must be provided by legislation. It should not 
be forgotten that South Africa is very weary of maintaining the divisions 
created by the separation of powers. It has been emphasised time and 
again that it is not the duty of a court to make law but rather it is the duty to 
apply law. The enactment of legislation would serve to uphold the 
traditional distinctions of the judiciary and legislature, and at the same time 
provide a greater sense of individual justice.  
 
However, it should be emphasised that the proposed legislation 
would only apply to standard form contracts and not to all unfair contracts. 
In this regard, it is argued that Germany has taken the correct approach 
and created a distinction in the law whereby standard form contracts are 
treated differently from the contracts in classical sense. One must always 
tread carefully when legislating for the private law sector. Legislation in the 
private law sector always limits the notion of freedom of contract, and 
therefore a justification for this individual justice must be evident. Such 
justification is evident in standard form contract cases for the reasons, 
which have been illustrated earlier.  
 
It is argued that South African law should also follow German law 
by instituting a watchdog organisation. Taking into consideration South 
Africa’s political and socio-economic climate, this watchdog organisation 
would be beneficial as it grants greater access to the law.    
 
 However, one should be careful when transplanting legislative 
ideas into another legal system, as the form and substance of a legal 
system are determined by the culture behind such system.415  Such 
cultural factors are, inter alia, the extent by which the members of a 
society are comfortable with uncertainty and the measures taken to 
minimise existing uncertainty.416  
 
                                                 
415 D Visser ‘Cultural Forces in the Making of Mixed Legal Systems’ (2003) 78 Tulane LR 
41 at 42. 
416 GH Hofstede Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (London: McGraw-
Hill, 1991) at 13 –15.  
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It is submitted that German society is less comfortable with 
uncertainty than South Africa’s society seems to be. A certain grade of 
uncertainty is established in South African contract law due to the 
centrality of the role of the judge and lack of legislation.417 These cultural 
differences should not, however, serve to prevent South Africa from 
introducing legislation on standard form contracts. The South African 
legislator is required to develop a codified approach to the problems that 
exist in standard form contractual relationships.  
 
South African courts attempt to protect the submitting party by 
employing the concept of public policy. This concept, although static, 
diverse and ever changing, seems to perpetually favour the notion of 
freedom of contract above other equally important and competing interests 
of the submitting party. In effect, the courts favour commercial expediency 
above the rights of the individual. This position is contrary to the rights 
contained within the Constitution and justice delayed is justice denied.  
 
As argued above, the comparison and subsequent evaluation of the 
German legal system provide a strong case for South Africa adopting 
legislation. The South African Law Commission has proposed with its 
“Control of Unreasonableness, Unconscionableness or Oppressiveness in 
Contracts or Terms Act” that legislation should be adopted. It is uncertain 
whether the delay in enacting such legislation is the result of an 
overworked national assembly or a manifestation of the general 
apprehension against legislation in the contractual law arena as a whole.    
                                                 
417 See Visser (note 415) for such uncertainty in English law. 
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Appendix 
 
Standard Form Contract Law of the German Civil Code, Effective 
January 1, 2002  (as translated by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard 
Dannemann).  
 
 
Section 2: Shaping contractual obligations by means of standard 
terms 
 
§ 305 Incorporation of standard terms into the contract 
(1) Standard terms are all contractual terms pre-established for a 
multitude of contracts which one party to the contract (the user) presents 
to the other party upon the conclusion of the contract. It is irrelevant 
whether the provisions appear as a separate part of a contract or are 
included in the contractual document itself, how extensive they are, what 
script is used for them, or what form the contract takes. Contractual terms 
do not constitute standard terms where they have been individually 
negotiated between the parties. 
 
(2) Standard terms are incorporated into the contract only if, during the 
conclusion of the contract, the user 
1. expressly draws the other party's attention to them, or if, on 
account of the way in which the contract is concluded, an express 
reference to them is unreasonably difficult, he draws his attention to 
them by means of a clearly visible sign at the place where the 
contract is concluded and 
2. gives the other party, in a reasonable manner that also 
appropriately takes account of any physical handicap of the other 
party discernible by the user, the possibility of gaining knowledge of 
their content, and if the other party agrees that they are to apply. 
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(3) Subject to observance of the requirements set out in subsection (2) 
above, the parties may agree in advance that particular standard terms 
will apply to a particular type of legal transaction. 
 
 
§ 305a Incorporation in special cases 
Even if the requirements set out in § 305(2) Nos 1 and 2 are not 
observed, if the other party agrees to their application: 
1. railway tariffs and regulations adopted with the approval of the 
competent transport authority or on the basis of international 
conventions and terms of transport, authorised in accordance with 
the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and motor 
vehicles in scheduled services are incorporated into the transport 
contract; 
2. standard terms published in the official journal of the regulatory 
authority for Post and Telecommunications and kept available in the 
user's business premises are incorporated 
(a) into contracts of carriage concluded away from business 
premises by the posting of items in post boxes, 
(b) into contracts for telecommunications, information and other 
services that are provided directly and in one go by means of 
remote communication and during the provision of a 
telecommunications service, if it is unreasonably difficult to 
make the standard terms available to the other party before 
conclusion of the contract. 
 
 
§ 305b Precedence of individually negotiated terms 
Individually negotiated terms take precedence over standard terms. 
 
 
§ 305c Surprising and ambiguous clauses 
(1) Provisions in standard terms which in the circumstances, in particular 
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in view of the outward appearance of the contract, are so unusual that the 
contractual partner of the user could not be expected to have reckoned 
with them, do not form part of the contract. 
 
(2) In case of doubt, standard terms are interpreted against the user. 
 
 
§ 306 Legal consequences of non-incorporation and invalidity 
(1) If all or some standard terms have not become part of the contract or 
are invalid, the remainder of the contract continues to be valid. 
 
(2) Where provisions have not become part of the contract or are invalid, 
the content of the contract is determined by the statutory rules. 
 
(3) The contract is invalid if one party would suffer unreasonable hardship 
if he were bound by the contract even after the amendment provided for 
in subsection (2) above. 
 
 
§ 306a No circumvention 
The rules in this section apply even if they are circumvented by other 
arrangements. 
 
 
§ 307 Content Control  
(1) Provisions in standard terms are invalid if, contrary to the requirement 
of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user at an 
unreasonable disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may also 
result from the fact that the provision is not clear and comprehensible. 
 
(2) In case of doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed if a 
provision 
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1. can not be reconciled with essential basic principles of the 
statutory rule from which it deviates, or 
2. restricts essential rights or duties resulting from the nature of the 
contract in such a manner that there is a risk that the purpose of the 
contract will not be achieved. 
 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above, and §§ 308 and 309 apply only to 
provisions in standard terms by means of which provisions derogating 
from legal rules or provisions supplementing those rules are agreed. 
Other provisions may be invalid under subsection (1), sentence 2, above, 
in conjunction with subsection (1), sentence 1, above. 
 
 
§ 308 Clauses whose validity depends on an evaluation  
In standard terms the following terms, in particular, are invalid: 
1. (period for acceptance or performance) 
a provision by which the user reserves the right to an unreasonably 
long or inadequately specified period for acceptance or rejection of 
an offer or for  
performance; this does not include reservation of the right to perform 
only after expiry of the period for revocation or return under §§ 355(1) 
and (2) and 356; 
2. (additional period for performance) 
a provision by which the user, in derogation from legislative 
provisions, reserves the right to an unreasonably long or 
inadequately specified additional period within which to perform; 
3. (right of termination) 
the stipulation of a right for the user to free himself, without an 
objectively justified reason specified in the contract, of his duty to 
perform; this does not apply to a contract for the performance of a 
recurring obligation; 
4. (right of amendment) 
the stipulation of the user's right to alter or depart from the promised 
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performance, unless, taking into account the user's interests, the 
stipulation to alter or depart from performance is reasonable for the 
other party; 
5. (fictitious declarations) 
a provision whereby a declaration of the user's contractual partner is 
deemed or not deemed to have been made by him if he does or fails 
to do a particular act, unless 
a) he is allowed a reasonable period within which to make an 
express declaration and 
b) the user undertakes to draw to his attention at the beginning 
of the period the particular significance of his conduct; this does 
not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B of the 
contracting rules for award of public works contracts is 
incorporated; 
6. (fictional receipt) 
a provision which provides that a declaration by the user of particular 
importance is deemed to have been received by the other party; 
7. (winding-up of contracts) 
a provision by which, in the event that one of the parties to the 
contract terminates the contract or gives notice to terminate it, the 
user can demand 
a) unreasonably high remuneration for the utilisation or use of a 
thing or a right or for performance made, or 
b) unreasonably high reimbursement of expenditure; 
8. (unavailability of the object of performance) 
a stipulation permitted under 3. above of the user's right to free 
himself of his obligation to perform the contract if the object of the 
performance is not available, unless the user agrees 
a) to inform the other party immediately of the unavailability, and 
b) immediately to refund counter-performance by that party. 
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§ 309 Clauses whose invalidity is not subject to any evaluation 
Even where derogation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the 
following are invalid in standard terms: 
1. (price increases at short notice) 
a provision which provides for an increase in the remuneration for 
goods or services that are to be supplied within four months of the 
conclusion of the contract; this does not apply to goods or services 
supplied in the course of a recurring obligation; 
2. (right to refuse to perform) 
a provision by which 
a) the right under § 320 of the contractual partner of the user to 
refuse to perform is excluded or restricted, or 
b) a right of retention of the contractual partner of the user, in so 
far as it arises from the same contractual relationship, is 
excluded or restricted, in particular by making it subject to 
recognition by the user of the existence of defects; 
3. (prohibition of set-off) 
a provision by which the contractual partner of the user is deprived of 
the right to set off a claim which is undisputed or has been declared 
final and absolute; 
4. (notice, period for performance) 
a provision by which the user is relieved of the statutory requirement 
to give notice to the other party to perform or to fix a period for 
performance or supplementary performance by him; 
5. (lump-sum claims for damages) 
stipulation of a lump-sum claim by the user for damages or for 
compensation for reduction in value, if 
a) the lump sum in the cases in question exceeds the damage 
expected in the normal course of events or the reduction in 
value which normally occurs, or 
b) the other party is not given the express right to prove that 
damage or reduction in value has not occurred or is materially 
lower than the lump sum agreed; 
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6. (penalty) 
a provision by which the user is entitled to receive payment of a 
penalty in the event of non-acceptance or late acceptance of 
performance, delay in payment or in the event that the other party 
withdraws from the contract; 
7. (exclusion of liability for death, injury to body and health and for 
gross fault) 
a) (death and injury to body and health) 
exclusion or limitation of liability for losses arising out of death, 
injury to body or health caused by negligent breach of duty by 
the user or a deliberate or negligent breach of duty by his 
statutory agent or a person employed by him to perform the 
contract; 
b) (gross fault) 
exclusion or limitation of liability for other losses caused by a 
grossly negligent breach of duty by the user or a deliberate or 
grossly negligent breach of duty by a statutory agent of the user 
or by a person employed by him to perform the contract; 
a) and b) above do not apply to restrictions of liability in the 
terms of transport, authorised in accordance with the Passenger 
Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and motor vehicles in 
scheduled services, in so far as they do not derogate, to the 
detriment of passengers, from the Regulation concerning the 
terms of transport by tram and trolley bus and by motor vehicles 
in scheduled services of 27 February 1970; b) above does not 
apply to restrictions of liability for State-approved lottery or raffle 
contracts. 
8. (other exclusions of liability in the event of breach of duty) 
a) (exclusion of the right to withdraw from the contract) 
a provision which, upon a breach of duty for which the user is 
responsible and which does not consist in a defect of the thing 
sold or the work, excludes or restricts the other party's right to 
withdraw from the contract; this does not apply to the terms of 
contract and tariff rules referred to in No. 7 on the conditions set 
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out therein; 
b) (defects) 
a provision by which, in contracts for the supply of new, 
manufactured things or of work, 
aa) (exclusion and reference of claims to third parties) 
claims against the user on account of a defect as a whole or 
with regard to individual elements of it are excluded entirely, 
restricted to the assignment of claims against third parties, or 
which make the pursuit of legal proceedings against third 
parties a condition precedent; 
bb) (restriction to supplementary performance) 
claims against the user are restricted, entirely or with regard 
to individual elements, to a right to supplementary 
performance, unless the other party is given an express right 
to claim a price reduction if supplementary performance is 
unsuccessful or, except where the defects liability is in 
respect of building work, to choose to terminate the contract; 
cc) (expenditure incurred in the course of supplementary 
performance) 
the user's obligation to bear the expenditure necessary for 
supplementary performance, in particular the costs of 
carriage, transport, labour and materials, is excluded or 
restricted; 
dd) (withholding of supplementary performance) 
the user makes supplementary performance conditional on 
the prior payment of the entire price or, having regard to the 
defect, an unreasonably high proportion thereof; 
ee) (time-limit for notice of defects) 
the user fixes a period within which the other party must give 
notice of non-obvious defects which is shorter than the 
period permitted under ff) below; 
ff) (facilitation of limitation) 
facilitates the limitation of claims on account of defects in the 
cases set out in § 438(1), No. 2 and § 634a(1), No. 2, or, in 
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other cases, results in a limitation period of less than one 
year from the date on which the statutory period of limitation 
begins; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of 
Part B of the contracting rules for award of public works 
contracts is incorporated; 
9. (period of recurring obligations) 
in a contractual relationship concerning the periodic delivery of goods 
or the periodic supply of services or work by the user, 
a) a contract duration which binds the other party for more than 
two years, 
b) a tacit extension of the contractual relationship which binds 
the other party for a period of more than one year in each 
particular case, or 
c) to the detriment of the other party, a period of notice to 
terminate the contract which is more than three months prior to 
the expiration of the initial or tacitly extended period of the 
contract; 
this does not apply to contracts for the supply of things sold as a 
unit, to insurance contracts or contracts between the owners of 
copyrights and of claims and copyright collecting societies within 
the meaning of the Protection of Copyrights and Related Rights 
Act; 
10. (change of contract partner) 
a provision whereby in sales contracts, contracts for the supply of 
services or contracts for work a third party assumes or may assume 
the rights and obligations of the user under the contract, unless the 
provision 
a) specifies the third party by name, or 
b) gives the other party the right to withdraw from the contract; 
11. (liability of an agent on conclusion of the contract) 
a provision by which the user imposes on an agent who concludes 
the contract for the other party, 
a) the agent's own liability or duty to perform the contractual 
obligation without having made an express and separate 
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declaration in that regard, or 
b) where the agent lacks authority, liability which exceeds that 
under § 179; 
12. (burden of proof)  
a provision by which the user alters the burden of proof to the 
detriment of the other party in particular by 
a) imposing the burden in respect of circumstances which fall 
within the scope of the user's responsibility, or 
b) requiring the other party to acknowledge particular facts; 
Subsection b) above does not apply to acknowledgments of 
receipt which are separately signed or bear a separate, qualified 
electronic signature; 
13. (Form of notices and declarations)  
a provision by which notices or declarations to be given to the user or 
third parties are subject to a stricter requirement than the need for 
writing or to special requirements with regard to receipt. 
 
 
§ 310 Scope of application  
(1) § 305(2) and (3) and §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to standard terms 
which are proffered to a businessperson, a legal person governed by 
public law or a special fund governed by public law. In those cases § 
307(1) and (2) nevertheless applies to the extent that this results in the 
invalidity of the contractual provisions referred to in §§ 308 and 309; due 
regard must be had to the customs and practices applying in business 
transactions. 
 
(2) §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to contracts of electricity, gas, district 
heating or water supply undertakings for the supply to special customers 
of electricity, gas, district heating or water from the supply grid unless the 
conditions of supply derogate, to the detriment of the customer, from 
Regulations on general conditions for the supply of tariff customers with 
electricity, gas, district heating or water. The first sentence applies mutatis 
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mutandis to contracts for the disposal of sewage. 
 
(3) In the case of contracts between a businessperson and a consumer 
(consumer contracts) the rules in this section apply subject to the following 
provisions: 
1. Standard terms are deemed to have been proffered by the 
businessperson, unless the consumer introduced them into the 
contract; 
2. §§ 305c(2) and §§ 306, 307 to 309 of the present Act and Article 
29a of the Introductory Act to the Civil Code apply to pre-established 
conditions of contract even if they are intended for use only once and 
in so far as, because they are pre-established, the consumer could 
not influence their content. 
3. When deciding whether there has been unreasonable detriment 
under § 307(1) and (2) the circumstances surrounding the conclusion 
of the contract must also be taken into account. 
 
(4) This section does not apply to contracts in the field of the law of 
succession, family law and company law or to collective agreements and 
private-or public-sector works agreements. When it is applied to labour 
contracts, appropriate regard must be had to the special features of labour 
law; § 305 (2) and (3) is not to be applied. Collective agreements and 
public and private sector works agreements are equivalent to legal rules 
within the meaning of § 307(3).
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